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This dissertation studies the effect of competition on firms’ decisions for hetero-
geneous innovation, and its implication for the recent decline in business dynamism
in the U.S. in the context of increasing competitive pressure by foreign firms due to
globalization. In Chapter 1, I theoretically investigate the effect of competition on
firm innovation by developing a discrete-time endogenous growth model where multi-
product firms do two types of innovation subject to friction in technology spillovers.
Firms improve their existing products through internal innovation while getting into
product markets outside of firms’ scope through external innovation. Novel friction I
consider is that it takes time to learn others’ technology during external innovation,
which I denote as an imperfect technology spillover. In contrast to existing models,
this friction allows incumbent firms to defend themselves from competitors by build-
ing technological barriers through internal innovation. I calibrate the model and run
counterfactual exercises of increasing competition, where competition is from either
outside of the economy, such as foreign exporters, or domestic firm entry. I find that
regardless of the source of competition, domestic incumbent firms i) increase their
internal innovation for products they have a technological advantage while decreas-
ing it for products with no technological advantage, and ii) decrease their external
innovation. This shift of innovation composition lowers firms’ investment in overall
innovation in the U.S., where firms are creative in the sense that they do a lot of
external innovation. However, increasing competition increases firms’ investment
in overall innovation in an economy where firms do less external innovation. In
an economy with high external innovation costs, firms put very little resource for
external innovation even before increasing competition, which implies that there is
little room for adjustment. Thus, although external innovation is decreased after
an increase in competition, this small reduction is more than offset by increased
internal innovation for defensive reasons. These findings highlight the importance
of examining the composition of innovation as opposed to overall innovation, and
sheds light on the reason for the differential effect of the same competition shock,
such as Chinese import competition, on firms’ overall innovation across different
countries identified by recent studies.
In Chapter 2, I empirically test the model predictions derived in Chapter 1, and
by building on these findings, I argue that the decline in high-growth firm activity
and startup rates in the U.S. is a result of multi-product firms’ optimal innovation
decisions in response to increasing competitive pressure by foreign firms due to
globalization. The three predictions I derive using a simplified three-period version
of my model are i) increasing competition makes innovative firms increase their
investment in internal innovation for defensive reasons, ii) if innovation intensity is
high in the economy, firms do less external innovation, and iii) increasing expected
profit makes firms invest more in internal innovation. By using firm-level data from
the U.S. Census Bureau integrated with firm-level patent data from the USPTO,
I find regression results consistent with the model’s predictions. Then, I extend
the baseline closed economy model developed in Chapter 1 and build a two-country
endogenous growth model to show that increasing competitive pressure by foreign
firms contributes to the recent decline in high-growth firm activities and startup
rates in the U.S. by inducing innovation-intensive and thus fast-growing firms to
invest more in internal innovation for defensive reasons. And because innovative
incumbents in each product market are now good at protecting their markets with
heightened technological barriers, all types of firms find it difficult to enter others’
markets through external innovation. Thus, the startup rate falls, and all firms
reduce their investment in external innovation. This shift in innovation cuts the
employment growth of innovation-intensive firms, as external innovation makes firms
grow faster than internal innovation by requiring firms to hire a new set of workers
to produce new products.
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Chapter 1: A Theory of Competition, Firm Innovation, and Growth
under Imperfect Technology Spillovers
1.1 Introduction
Studies of the effect of competition on firm innovation have a long history, as
economists br that innovation is a major source of economic growth. Researchers
have studied the impact of competition within different product markets and across
countries with varying degrees of development, both empirically and theoretically.
The results, however, are inconclusive. As documented in Gilbert (2006), differences
in market structure, types of innovation, and degree of protection for innovation
cause incentives for innovation to move in different directions and offset each other.
In this chapter, I theoretically investigate the effect of competition on firm
innovation by developing a discrete-time endogenous growth model where multi-
product firms do two types of innovation—internal and external—subject to imper-
fect technology spillovers in the form of lagged learning of others’ technology, ex-
tending the Akcigit and Kerr (2018) framework. Aided by this model, I decompose
the overall changes in innovation in response to increasing competition into changes
in the level and composition of the two types of innovation. I show that competition
1
can either increase or decrease overall innovation, because i) competition affects the
two types of innovation differently, and ii) factors such as the innovation cost struc-
ture determine the relative changes in the two types of innovation in response to
competition.
In the real world, firms are multi-product firms, and they grow both by expand-
ing their existing markets and entering other product markets. Thus, firms’ growth
paths depend on their product portfolio choices. In my model, I allow multi-product
firms to choose their product portfolio through two types of innovation. Firms use
internal innovation to improve their existing product quality and production pro-
cesses, and use external innovation to enter new markets outside of their existing
scope and drive incumbent firms out.1
Also, in the real world, firms can defend their product markets from com-
petitors by improving their products further. My study shows that this channel is
important in understanding firm growth and firm entry. If own product improve-
ment can be an effective tool for blocking competitors from either entering into or
expanding in a firm’s existing product market, then internal innovation affects not
only an individual firm’s growth path but also firm entry in each product market.
Existing models, however, assume either that firms have a single product, or that
they can’t use innovation defensively.
In existing models that allow multi-product firms to grow through product
scope expansion (e.g., Klette and Kortum (2004) and Akcigit and Kerr (2018)),
1A real-world example of external innovation is Apple developing iPhone and getting into the
cell phone industry back in 2007 when its major business was on computer manufacturing. A real-
world example of internal innovation is Apple improving and producing iPhone 11 from iPhone
10.
2
firms cannot protect their markets because any firm can learn and copy other firms’
frontier technology immediately. Thus, escape-competition through improving one’s
own technology is not possible. Existing models with step-by-step innovation, such
as Aghion et al. (2001) and Akcigit et al. (2018), allow for certain forms of escape-
competition, but assume single-product firms. This lack of realism in existing models
limits their ability to analyze the effect of competition on firm innovation and firm
growth. To move forward, I allow multi-product firms to defend their product
markets through internal innovation by introducing a friction in learning others’
technology, which I label as imperfect technology spillovers.
When a firm attempts to enter another firm’s market and take over through ex-
ternal innovation, it first needs to learn the technology of the incumbent firm so that
it can then improve on top. Realistically, however, there are lags in learning others’
technology. In my model economy, imperfect technology spillovers take the form of
lagged learning, in which potential rival firms can only learn the product-specific
technology of incumbent firms with a one-period lag.2 Thus, internal innovation
is built on the current frontier technology, while external innovation is built on
lagged technology. Imperfect spillovers generate a technology gap, defined as the
gap between the current period frontier technology for a given product that only
the incumbent can use, and the one-period lagged technology that potential rival
firms can learn through R&D.
Then, incumbent firms can use this time lag to improve their technology fur-
ther through internal innovation for defensive reasons, which makes it harder for
2This is equivalent to saying that it takes one period to learn others’ technology.
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competitors to catch up with their technology and steal their business. In other
words, incumbent firms can build a technological advantage in their markets. In
such an environment, individual firms use internal innovation not only to improve
the profitability of their products but also to escape competition. In this sense,
my framework brings together quality-ladder innovation models and step-by-step
innovation models. The flip side is that defensive internal innovation by incumbents
makes it difficult to take over another firm’s market through external innovation, as
firms need to overcome the technological advantage of incumbent firms. This tech-
nological barrier can become higher if competition increases, because competition
incentivizes incumbents to do more internal innovation.
The introduction of imperfect technology spillovers is the key theoretical con-
tribution that allows us to distinguish the effect of competitive pressure on internal
versus external innovation. In addition, imperfect technology spillovers imply a
novel technological-barrier effect, in which factors that affect defensive internal in-
novation also affect the probability of successful external innovation and business
takeover in the economy.
To my knowledge, this is the first theoretical model of defensive innovation
that allows individual multi-product firms to grow both by improving in their ex-
isting markets and by taking other firms’ markets, through two different types of
innovation. Allowing for both internal and external innovation is important for
understanding the effect of competition on firms’ innovation decisions, as well as
firm-level and aggregate economic growth. Firms have different incentives for differ-
ent types of innovation, and they can use these two types of innovation strategically
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to increase their profits and the probability of survival. Also, Akcigit and Kerr
(2018) show that external innovation contributes more than internal innovation to
both firm employment growth and aggregate economic growth. Thus, allowing for
only one type of innovation, while ignoring potential compositional changes, could
disguise the true effect of competition on innovation.
A simple three-period version of my model analytically shows how both types
of innovation respond to increasing competition by decomposing firms’ innovation
incentives into three terms, namely the escape-competition effect, the Schumpete-
rian effect, and the technological barrier effect. I show that the technology gap,
which summarizes the technological advantage incumbent firms have in their own
market, and determines the gain in future profits from internal innovation, is the
key to understanding why some firms increase while others decrease their internal
innovation when competition increases. Internal innovation increases expected fu-
ture profits by improving product quality, thus widening the technology gap and
lowering the probability of losing the product line to another firm. For this reason,
increasing competition induces firms to increase their internal innovation efforts,
which is the escape-competition effect. On the other hand, increased competition
raises the aggregate probability of losing a product line (the aggregate creative de-
struction arrival rate), as there are more firms performing external innovation in the
economy. This lowers the expected profits from each product line and discourages
firms’ internal and external innovation, which is the Schumpeterian effect.
Whether a firm increases or decreases its internal innovation intensity for each
of its products depends on which of these two effects dominates. I show that the
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escape competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect for firms that have
innovated intensively in recent periods, and therefore are likely to have technolog-
ical advantage accumulated in their own markets. Thus, increasing competition
motivates innovation-intensive, high-growth firms to increase their internal innova-
tion for defensive reasons. These firms become better at protecting themselves from
competitors by building technological barriers in their existing markets.3
For an individual firm, the aggregate internal innovation intensity and the
distribution of the technology gap determine the probability of a successful busi-
ness takeover for a given amount of external innovation effort. The higher the
average technology gap and the more internal innovation effort of incumbent firms,
the harder it is to take over another firm’s product market. I define this as the
technological-barrier effect. Increased competition increases the average value of
the technology gap distribution by changing both individual firm’s internal inno-
vation decisions and the aggregate external innovation intensity. Thus, increased
competition lowers individual firms’ optimal external innovation intensity through
the Schumpeterian effect and the technological-barrier effect.
To understand the effect of increasing competition on the composition of in-
novation and the aggregate economy, I calibrate an infinite-horizon version of my
model to innovative firms the U.S. manufacturing sector from 1987 to 1997 and
perform three counterfactual exercises: i) increased competitive pressure by foreign
firms (so that the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate depends in part on for-
3For example, as of 2020, we hear that Apple is planning to introduce new iPhones more
frequently, twice per year, because competition in the cellphone industry is intensified.
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eign firms), ii) increased competitive pressure by foreign firms in an economy where
the external innovation cost is much higher than in the U.S., and iii) lower entry
costs (specifically, a lower external innovation cost for potential startups).
Because the change in the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate (equiva-
lently, the change in competitive pressure) is held constant, the three counterfactual
exercises result in the same change in individual incumbent firms’ innovation de-
cisions. That is, incumbent firms increase their internal innovation for existing
products for which they have a technological advantage, decrease their internal in-
novation for products for which they have no technological advantage, and decrease
their external innovation.
However, the three exercises result in very different changes in the aggregate
economy. Comparing the results from exercises i) and ii), I show that the average
firm-level R&D to sales ratio decreases in response to increased foreign competition
in the economy calibrated to the U.S., but would increase in an economy with a
higher external innovation cost (low creativity). In an economy with high external
innovation costs, firms put few resources into external innovation even when com-
petition is low, which implies that there is very little room for further downward
adjustment. Thus, although external innovation falls after an increase in competi-
tive pressure, this reduction is more than offset by increased investment for internal
innovation for defensive reasons. In the economy calibrated to the U.S., on the
other hand, firms are active in doing external innovation, and the decrease due to
increasing competition is substantial. Thus, overall innovation falls.
This result sheds light on the differential effect of Chinese import competition
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on firms’ overall innovation across different countries identified by recent studies
such as Bloom et al. (2016), Autor et al. (2019), and my own empirical results
in Chapter 2. This result also highlights the importance of examining changes
in the composition of innovation as opposed to changes in overall innovation for
understanding the effect of competition on firm innovation.
In exercise iii), incumbent firms respond to increasing domestic competitive
pressure in the same way as under an increase in competitive pressure due to foreign
firms. However, firm entry responds differently. The mass of domestic startups
decreases in response to an increase in competitive pressure from foreign firms,
while it increases in the case of lowered domestic entry costs. This insight can allow
researchers to identify whether competitive pressure comes from foreign firms or
from the domestic entry margin.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 develops a discrete-time
infinite horizon baseline general equilibrium model. Section 1.3 analyzes a simple
three-period model to study the proposed mechanism in detail and derive empirically
testable predictions. Section 1.4 presents results from quantitative analysis of the
baseline model. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Baseline Model
In this section, I introduce a discrete time infinite horizon endogenous growth
model with multi-product firms, two types of innovation, imperfect technological
spillovers, and an exogenous source of competitive pressure. The exogenous com-
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petitive pressure can come from firms in foreign countries if we consider the aggregate
economy, or from domestic incumbent firms in other sectors or states if we consider
a certain sector or state. The baseline model extends Akcigit and Kerr (2018) in
three dimensions: i) I assume imperfect technology spillovers by assuming that R&D
expenditure on external innovation only allows rivals to learn the incumbent’s tech-
nology lagged by one period, ii) I introduce an escape-competition effect, in which
incumbent firms’ internal innovation decision depends on last period’s innovation
results, which are summarized by the technology gap ∆j,t “
qj,t
qj,t´1
, and iii) I allow
for shifts of the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate to analyze the effect of
increasing competitive pressure on firms’ innovation and growth dynamics.
Hereafter, the time subscript is suppressed whenever there is no confusion.
Superscript 1 is used to denote next period variables (t ` 1), and subscript ´1 is
used for last period variables (t´ 1). The terms product quality and technology are
used interchangeably.
1.2.1 Representative Household
The representative household has a logarithmic utility function and is popu-
lated by a measure one continuum of individuals. Each individual supplies one unit
of labor each period inelastically and consumes a portion Ct of the economy’s final







Homogeneous workers are employed in the final goods sector (L). Thus in each
period, the labor market satisfies
L “ 1 . (1.1)
1.2.2 Final Good Producer
The final good producer uses labor (L) and a continuum of differentiated
products indexed by j P r0, 1s to produce a final good. Denote D as the index set
for differentiated products produced by domestic firms. Products with j R D are
produced by foreign firms (or domestic incumbent firms in other sectors/states), as
discussed later. The constant returns to scale production technology w.r.t. labor

















where yj is the quantity of differentiated product j, qj is its quality, and It¨u are
indicator functions. The final good price is normalized to be one in every period
without loss of generality. The final good is produced competitively and input prices
are taken as given.
1.2.3 Differentiated Products Producers
There is a set of measure Fd domestic firms and a set of measure Fo foreign
firms with Fd ` Fo P p0, 1q, which are determined endogenously in equilibrium,
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produce differentiated products each period and sell their products in domestic
markets. Each differentiated product is produced in the producer’s own region
using domestic resources.4 Since each operating firm owns at least one product line,
and each product line is owned by a single firm, a firm f can be characterized by
the collection of its product lines J f “ tj : j is owned by firm fu. Only the owner
of each product line can observe the product-line specific current period technology




each product line can be characterized by its quality and technology gap, (qj,∆j).
Each differentiated product j P r0, 1s is produced at a unit marginal cost in terms
of the final good.
1.2.4 Innovation by Differentiated Good Producers
The differentiated good producers engage in two types of R&D—internal and
external—to increase their profits from products they currently produce, to pro-
tect their product markets from competitors, and to expand their businesses, where
the R&D output takes the form of improvements in product quality (equivalently,
production technology). Innovation outcomes are realized at the beginning of the
next period. To allow incumbent firms to protect their own product markets from
competitors (the escape-competition effect) and to capture the fact that it is more
difficult to take over other firms’ product markets when firms are very innovative
on average (the technological-barrier effect), I introduce imperfect technological
4If competitive pressure is from foreign firms, then firm’s own region is own country. If com-
petitive pressure is from other state, then firm’s own region is the state firm operates.
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spillovers, which are captured by lagged learning: firms that don’t own product
line j can only learn the incumbent’s last period technology, qj,t´1. Thus, external
innovation builds on the past-period technology. Also, I assume that a domestic
firm can learn a foreign firm’s lagged technology if and only if that foreign firm sells
its products in the domestic market.
In this setup, learning another firm’s technology is costly in a sense that i) ri-
vals can only learn incumbent firms’ last period technology, and ii) learning involves
R&D—only firms with strictly positive R&D expenditure can learn another firm’s
past technology through undirected learning.5 For a particular product, the current
period technology qj,t and the technology gap ∆j,t ”
qj,t
qj,t´1
are observable only to
the firm operating product line j in that period. However, aggregate variables and
the technology gap distribution (the share of product lines with a certain level of
technology gap) are publicly observable, and these are the objects individual firms
need to know to make their optimal innovation decisions. Thus, a stationary equilib-
rium is well defined. When two firms’ technologies are neck and neck in a particular
product line, a coin-toss tiebreaker rule applies as in Acemoglu et al. (2016) to make
sure each product is produced by only one firm. An unused technology (idea) is as-
sumed to depreciate by an amount sufficient to ensure that it becomes unprofitable
to innovate on top of it next period.6 Thus, only the winning firm from the coin
toss keeps the product line until it is taken over by another firm through creative
destruction (external innovation), while the losing firm never tries to enter the same
5Firms do not know which product line technology they will learn prior to their learning. This
assumption helps keep the model tractable.
6If you don’t recall your skill or idea frequently, you gradually forget about it. This is in some
sense consistent with the literature discussing displaced workers’ human capital depreciation.
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market through internal innovation. Thus, the undirected nature of external inno-
vation is ensured, and only the firm currently producing a product is allowed to do
internal innovation on that product. Finally, to maintain tractability I assume that
each firm can do only one external innovation in each period regardless of the total
number of product lines the firm owns.
1.2.4.1 Internal Innovation
Successful internal innovation improves the current quality qj,t by λ ą 1. The
probability of successful internal innovation, zj,t, is determined by the level of R&D









where pχ ą 0 and pψ ą 1. Thus incumbent firm’s good j quality realized at the























with probability 1´ zj,t .
As time is discrete and firms are multi-product firms, internal innovation outcomes
follow a binomial process as in Ates and Saffie (2016).
7Hereafter, I write the quality of product j as a point set. This makes it easy to write the case
when external innovation fails and firm does not acquire any product lines, which will be written
as product quality set to be an empty set.
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1.2.4.2 External Innovation
Incumbents and potential startups attempt to take over other incumbents’
markets through external innovation. Successful external innovation generates an
improvement in product quality of η ą 1 relative to the incumbent’s lagged tech-
nology, where R&D results are realized at the beginning of next period. I assume
λ2 ą η ą λ. This assumption ensures that firms can protect their own product lines
from potential rivals through internal innovation, while η ą λ reflects the idea that
external innovation introduces a new way of producing an existing product more
efficiently. Thus, external innovation contributes more to both firm employment
and aggregate growth than internal innovation, as found empirically in Akcigit and
Kerr (2018). Both potential startups’ and incumbent firms’ external innovations are
undirected in a sense that they are realized in any other product line with equal
probability.
Existing firms with at least one product line (nf ą 0) decide the probability
of external innovation xt by choosing R&D expenditures R
ex










where rχ ą 0, and rψ ą 1, and q̄t is the average quality in the country where the
firm is located. Thus, for prospective external innovators whose takeover is not
pre-empted by an incumbent’s successful defensive innovation, the distribution of
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Figure 1.1: Firms’ Innovation and Product Quality Evolution Example




















∅ with probability 1´ xt .
With probability 1 ´ xt, the external innovation fails, which implies there is zero
probability that the firm will take over product line j. In this case, product quality
for product line j for the potential entrant does not exist.
To better understand the firm’s innovation decisions, and to show how busi-
ness takeover through external innovation and escape competition through internal
innovation work in detail, the following section graphically illustrates specific cases.
1.2.4.3 Business Takeover and Escape Competition, an Illustration
Figure 1.1 illustrates how firms’ product quality portfolio and technology gap
portfolio evolve over time. Firm A owns the first three product lines and firm B owns
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the last four product lines in period t. Each bar represents a product and the height
of the bar represents the log of product quality for each product, pqj,t ” logpqj,tq.
Product line 7 is not innovated by any firm. Thus, its quality in t ` 1 remains
the same as that in t, and it is still owned by firm B in t ` 1. In case i), firm B
does external innovation in an attempt to take over firm A’s product line 1. Firm
A took this product line over through successful external innovation at t ´ 1, but
did not internally innovate at t. So ∆1,t “ η, and q
A
1,t`1 “ ηq1,t´1 (implying that
pqA1,t`1 “ pη ` pq1,t´1, where pη ” logpηq) for firm A. Firm B, meanwhile, learns q1,t´1
in period t and innovates, so that in period t ` 1, it realizes qB1,t`1 “ ηq1,t´1, which
is the same as qA1,t`1. A coin is tossed and firm A is the winner. Thus, firm A
keeps product line 1. Case ii) illustrates how a firm can lose its existing product line
through another firm’s external innovation (creative destruction). Firm A failed to
do internal innovation on product line 2 in periods t´1 and t. Thus, at the beginning
of period t` 1, the quality of product line 2 for firm A is equal to qA2,t`1 “ q2,t´1. A
potential startup learns product line 2’s last period technology (quality) by investing
in R&D in period t and succeeds in externally innovating the product quality. Thus,
at the beginning of period t`1, the product quality of product line 2 for the potential




2,t`1, the startup takes over
product line 2. Case iii) illustrates how incumbent firm A can take over incumbent
firm B’s product line through external innovation, despite internal innovation by
incumbent firm B. Since there was no internal innovation between t ´ 1 and t for
product line 5, q5,t “ q5,t´1. Thus, firm A’s quality for product line 5 after external
innovation is qA5,t`1 “ ηq5,t. Firm B internally innovates product line 5 in period
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t. Thus, firm B’s quality for product line 5 is qB5,t`1 “ λq5,t´1. Since η ą λ,
firm A takes over product line 5. Case iv) illustrates how firms can escape from
competition (creative destruction) through successful internal innovation. Firm B
succeeds in internally innovating its product line 6 for two consecutive periods. Thus,
the quality of product line 6 for firm B in period t ` 1 is equal to qB6,t`1 “ λ
2q6,t´1.
Rival firms can increase the quality for product line 6 only up to qe6,t`1 “ ηq6,t´1.
Since λ2 ą η, firm B successfully protects product line 6 from competitors. These
examples show an important feature that is unique to the economy with imperfect
technology spillovers. Because incumbents can escape competition through internal
innovation, not all firms that succeed in external innovation can successfully take
over another firm’s business. Thus, the success probability of a business takeover is
generally lower than the probability of external innovation, and it depends on the
existing technology gap in the target market (product).
1.2.4.4 Product Quality Evolution
As a rival firm can only learn last period’s technology, the technology gap,
defined as ∆j,t “
qj,t
qj,t´1
, is the most important factor determining an incumbent
firm’s success/failure at protecting its product line through internal innovation. The
technology gap summarizes the technological advantage incumbent firms have in
their own markets. In this model, there are four possible values for the technology
gap:
Lemma 1. There can be only four values for the technology gap in this economy,
17
∆1 “ 1, ∆2 “ λ, ∆3 “ η, and ∆4 “ η
λ
, and product lines with ∆3 and ∆4 can occur
only through external innovation.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.2.1.
To describe the evolution of product quality and the implied probabilities of
retaining or losing a product from the perspective of an incumbent firm, consider a
product line j with quality qj,t and technology gap ∆j,t owned by a firm f . Denote
z`j as the probability of internal innovation for product line j when its technology
gap is equal to
qj,t
qj,t´1
“ ∆`. Suppose product line j has technology gap ∆j,t “ ∆
1. If
the firm is successful at internal innovation with probability z1j , its product quality
next period is qinj,t`1 “ λqj,t´1; otherwise, q
in
j,t`1 “ qj,t´1.
If creative destruction arrives at rate x—where x is the probability that an indi-
vidual product market is faced with a rival that succeeded in external innovation—
then the product quality of the rival will equal qenj,t`1 “ ηqj,t´1. Since q
en
j,t`1 ą
λqj,t´1 ą qj,t´1, the rival takes over product line j regardless of the firm’s success
at internal innovation. Thus with probability x, firm f loses product line j next
period.
With the same arguments, product quality for product line j for firm f next





















































































































































where product quality set equal to ∅ means that firm f loses product line j next
period, and the 1
2
terms in the probabilities are due to the coin-toss tiebreaker rule
for neck and neck cases. Thus for any ∆` except for ∆1, firms can lower the prob-
ability of losing its product lines by investing more in internal innovation, where
the magnitude of the decrease in probability of losing the product depends on the
technology gap. For this reason, firms have incentive to increase their internal
innovation intensity (R&D investment that increases the probability of internal in-
novation) when they are faced with more competition, as represented by a higher
creative destruction arrival rate x.
The conditional takeover probability — the probability of product takeover,
conditional on successful external innovation — can be computed as follows. If a
rival firm succeeds in externally innovating a product line with technology gap ∆1,
then it takes over this product line with probability one. For a product line with
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technology gap ∆2, this probability is equal to 1 ´ z2; for technology gap ∆3 it
is 1
2
p1 ´ z3q, and for technology gap ∆4 it is 1 ´ 1
2
z4.8 Thus with a technology






conditional takeover probability is equal to
xtakeover “ µp∆
1











The higher the overall innovation (both internal and external) intensity, the wider
is the average technology gap in the economy. Thus it becomes more difficult for
rival firms to take over other firms’ product markets. This conditional takeover
probability defines the technological barrier channel through which either incum-
bent firms’ increasing internal innovation intensity, or an increase in the overall
external innovation intensity in the economy (reflected as an increase in the ag-
gregate creative destruction arrival rate) could lower domestic firms’ incentive for
external innovation, which results in lower firm growth rates. This technological
barrier effect is distinct from the well-known Schumpeterian effect, by which firms’
innovation incentives decline due to lowered expected future profits conditional on
successful innovation. Higher overall innovation intensity in the economy will likely
lower xtakeover, as the share of product lines with technology gap ∆
1 (where the
probability of product takeover is the highest) will decrease, while at least some
of the z` for ` “ 2, 3, 4 will increase. Since all firms, including potential startups,
know the level of xtakeover, firms will optimally choose to lower their external inno-
8Here I assume internal innovation intensity z depends only on technology gap ∆`. In the next
section, I prove this is the case.
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vation intensity when xtakeover falls, unless expected profits from external innovation
increase enough to offset the loss from a lowered conditional takeover probability.








probability of a firm failing in an attempted product takeover—the probability of
not winning the product line, either due to failure of external innovation (which
occurs with probability of 1´ x) or escape-competition by incumbent firms—is
p1´ xq ` xz2µp∆2q ` x
1
2

















Given the above definition of the conditional takeover probability xtakeover, the pre-
vious expression can be written as 1 ´ x xtakeover. Denote xtakeover ” x xtakeover as
the unconditional probability of successful product takeover.
The probability distribution of the evolution of product quality from the per-
spective of a rival firm can be similarly defined and is described in Appendix A.1.2.2.
1.2.5 Potential Startups
The economy has a fixed mass of potential domestic startups Ed, and an ex-
ogenously determined mass of foreign firms trying to start businesses in domestic
markets.9 To start a business, a potential startup invests in external R&D and, if
successful, takes over a product line from an incumbent firm. Similar to incumbent
9Strictly speaking, only a portion of the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate accounted
by outside firms is exogenously determined in this economy. However, this is effectively the same
as having the exogenously determined mass of outside firms trying to start businesses in domestic
markets, as it will become clear in the following sections.
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firms, potential startups decide the probability of external innovation xe by choosing









where rχe ą 0, and rψe ą 1, and q̄ is the average quality in the country where the
potential startup is located.
Let V ptpqj,∆jquq denote the value of a firm that has one product line with
product quality qj and technology gap ∆j. Then a potential startup’s expected











where the expectation conditioning on xe is taken over the distribution of incum-
bents’ product quality qj and technology gap ∆j due to the undirected nature of
external innovation. Potential startups choose the probability of external innovation
xe that maximizes the expected profits from entry. Since there is no ex-ante hetero-
geneity among potential startups, all of them choose the same optimal probability
of external innovation x˚e . Thus, the mass of potential domestic startups that suc-
ceed in external innovation and try to take over incumbent firms’ product markets
is Edx˚e .
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1.2.6 Exogenous Competitive Pressure and Creative Destruction
As briefly explained in the previous section, the aggregate creative destruction
arrival rate is the probability (frequency) that in each product market an individual
incumbent faces a rival (a domestic startup, a domestic incumbent or a foreign firm)
that succeeded in external innovation. Conditional on external innovation, whether
the incumbent is replaced by the rival firm depends on the technology gap and
internal innovation of the incumbent.
Each firm can externally innovate at most one product line each period, and
there is a continuum of unit mass of product lines (markets). Thus, the total mass
of firms that succeed in external innovation is equal to the total mass of prod-
uct markets for which the incumbent faces a rival firm. Since external innovation
is undirected, this implies that the probability an individual product market in-
cumbent is faced with competition from an another firm—the aggregate creative
destruction arrival rate—is equal to the total mass of firms that succeed in external
innovation. Denote xd as the total mass of domestic firms that succeed in exter-
nal innovation, and denote xo as the foreign firm counterpart. Then the aggregate
creative destruction arrival rate x is
x “ xd ` xo .
Increased competitive pressure from foreign firms comes from the increased mass of
foreign firms trying to start businesses in domestic markets Eo, which increases the
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mass of foreign firms operating in domestic markets Fo. Thus increasing competitive
pressure is defined as an exogenous increase in xo in this model economy.
1.2.7 Equilibrium
I now turn to describing optimal decisions for each agent and the Markov Per-
fect Equilibrium of the economy, where optimal decisions depend only on individual
characteristics, aggregate variables, and the technology gap distribution.
1.2.7.1 Optimal Production and Employment
The solution for the final good producer’s profit maximization problem defines
the final good producer’s optimal demands for labor and differentiated products.
Denote pj as the price for differentiated product j, and w as the wage rate in the





In deriving demand for product j I assume that each product is supplied
by a single firm. However, past incumbent firms in domestic markets that lost
technological leadership to the current leader could in principle try to produce and
sell their products through limit pricing, as the marginal cost of production is equal
across all firms. To avoid such cases and to simplify the model, I assume the following
two-stage price-bidding game:
Assumption 1. In a given product line j in a given economy, the current incum-
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bents and any former incumbents in the same line enter a two-stage price-bidding
game. In the first stage, each firm pays a fee of ε ą 0. In the second stage, all firms
that paid the fee announce their prices.
This assumption ensures that only the technological leader enters the first stage and
announces its price in equilibrium.
Differentiated products producers (both domestic and foreign) take their prod-
ucts demand curve from the final good producer (1.6) as given and maximize profit









Note that since each differentiated product is produced at unit marginal cost in
terms of the final good, the differentiated product producers’ problem for supplying
to the domestic market is the same for both domestic firms and foreign firms. The
FOC of this problem yields optimal level of differentiated product j production:
yj “ p1´ θq
1
θLqj , (1.7)
and by plugging this into the final good producer’s differentiated product j demand






which is a markup 1
1´θ
over the unit marginal cost. Using (1.7), we get the profit
from individual differentiated product production, which is linear in its quality,
holding aggregate variables fixed:






From the final good producer’s problem, an equilibrium wage rule is given by
w “ θp1´ θq
1´2θ
θ q , (1.9)
which depends only on the average product quality in the economy. Since
L “ 1 (1.10)
in equilibrium, the optimal level of differentiated product j production becomes
yj “ p1´ θq
1
θ qj (1.11)
and the scaling part of the profit from differentiated product production becomes
π “ θp1´ θq
1´θ
θ .
Finally, using (1.10) and (1.11), equilibrium final good production can be written
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as
Y “ p1´ θq
1´2θ
θ q , (1.12)
which grows at the same rate as average (total) product quality.
1.2.7.2 Value Function for Incumbent Firm in the Differentiated Prod-
uct Market
In this section, I solve for a differentiated product firm’s optimal R&D decision.
Define Φf ” tpqj,∆jqujPJ f as a multi-set of product quality and technology gap
pairs currently owned by differentiated products producer f , where pqj,∆jq defines





































where πqj is revenue net of production cost. Thus the first three terms define
current profits of a firm with product quality and technology gap portfolio Φf , and
the last term is discounted expected future value, where the conditional expectation
is taken over the success or failure of internal and external innovation, creative
destruction arrival, winning or losing coin-tosses (c-t), the current period product
quality distribution, and the current period technology gap distribution. rβ is the
stochastic discount factor, which is constant over time as there is no uncertainty in
this economy.
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, the value func-





is of the form:











‚ ` B q ,
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and optimal innovation probabilities are
z1 “
«

























































g in the expression for B is the average product quality growth rate in the economy,
and Atakeover in the expressions for B and x is the ex-ante value of a product line






















Proof: See Appendix A.1.3.1
As the expression shows, the determinants of Atakeover include factors that determine
the conditional takeover probability xtakeover.
A` is the sum of discounted expected profits from owning a product line with
technology gap equal to ∆`, normalized by the current period product quality. The
first two terms in (1.13) through (1.16) are the normalized instantaneous profits,
and the terms inside the brackets are the normalized option value from internal
innovation. If a firm succeeds in internally innovating its product and still owns
that product next period, then the normalized value of that product is equal to
A2, as the next period technology gap is equal to ∆
2. If the firm fails to internally
innovate its product but still owns that product next period, then the normalized
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value of that product is equal to A1 as the next period technology gap is equal
to ∆1. B is the sum of discounted expected profits from owning an additional
product through external innovation, normalized by the average product quality.
To understand this variable more clearly, rewrite it as
Bq “ xrβAtakeoverq ´ rχx
rψq ` rβp1` gqBq .
After investing rχx
rψq in external innovation in the current period, the firm receives
the discounted expected profit Atakeoverq if external innovation succeeds with prob-
ability x next period. The firm owns at least one product line next period if current
period external innovation is successful. Thus, it will invest in external innova-
tion next period and receive an expected profit of Bq1 two periods later, where
q1 “ p1`gqq. Thus, (1.17) shows that B is the annuity value of an infinite stream of
constant payoffs xrβAtakeover ´ rχx
rψ at a constant discount rate rβp1` gq, the growth
rate adjusted time discount factor.
For all of the optimal probabilities of internal innovation, the first term inside
the brackets in the numerator (after rβ) is the option value from successful internal
innovation, which increases quality by λ. The second term is the option value from
no internal innovation, which makes next period’s technology gap equal to one.
Thus, the higher the option value for successful internal innovation, the higher is
the optimal probability of internal innovation, holding x fixed. For this reason,
the optimal probability of internal innovation for each product line depends on its
technology gap. Intuitively, a wider technology gap should up to a point increase
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firms’ internal innovation investment, as this implies that escape from competition is
easier. However, past some point a wider technology gap should dissuade incumbent
firms from investing in internal innovation, since it is much harder for other firms
to take over a product line with a very high technology gap. Thus. there is a low
probability that an incumbent firm will lose a product line when it has very high
technology gap. Corollary 1 formalizes this argument.
Corollary 1. In an equilibrium where tz`u4`“1 are well defined, the probabilities of
internal innovation satisfy z2 ą z3 ą z4 ą z1.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.3.2
Thus, for a product line with the widest technology gap ∆3 “ η, firms invest less in
internal innovation than they do for a product line with ∆2 “ λ, as there is a lower
probability they will lose the product line even if they don’t improve its quality—
firms with technology gap ∆3 lose a product line only when they are in a neck and
neck case and lose the coin toss. Thus, z2 ą z3, even though ∆3 ą ∆2.
Since A1 and A2 depend on x, it is difficult to sign the partial derivatives of
tz`u4`“1 w.r.t. x. But holding the values for A1 and A2 fixed, we can determine the
signs of the partial derivatives, which defines the escape-competition effect:
Corollary 2. With rψ P p1, 2s, the escape-competition effect is the highest and pos-
itive for product lines with technology gap equal to ∆2, whereas it is the lowest and
negative for product lines with technology gap equal to ∆1. The escape-competition
effect is positive for the ∆3 case, whereas its sign is ambiguous for the ∆4 case.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.3.3
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As equation (1.2) shows, a firm cannot protect its product line from takeover through
internal innovation if its technology gap is equal to ∆1. This is why z1 is a decreasing
function of the creative destruction arrival rate x, other things being equal. As
equation (1.3) shows, thee impact of internal innovation on the probability of losing
their product is greatest in the ∆2 case. Thus, the escape-competition incentive
is the highest for this case. In the ∆3 case, a marginal increase in z3 decreases
the probability of losing the product by 50% less than in the ∆2 case. Thus the
escape-competition effect is lower. The escape-competition effect for the ∆4 case is
ambiguous as the probability decrease is even lower.
Meanwhile, the term A2 in the optimal probability of internal innovation re-
flects the Schumpeterian effect. The lower the expected future profits from keeping
the product line through internal innovation, the lower is the incentive to invest in
internal innovation.
The optimal probability of external innovation depends on internal innova-
tion intensities, product values (tA`u
4
`“1), and the technology gap distribution. The
definition of Atakeover and equation (1.22) indicate that higher overall innovation
intensities (internal and external) in the economy lower the incentive for external
innovation for an individual firm in partial equilibrium, holding product values fixed.
This is the technological-barrier effect summarized in the conditional takeover prob-
ability xtakeover. Holding probabilities of internal innovation and the technology
gap distribution fixed, a decrease in product values decreases an individual firm’s
incentive for external innovation. This is the Schumpeterian effect.
The direction of the changes in the probabilities of internal and external in-
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novation in response to changes in the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate
x are ambiguous in general equilibrium. They depend on the relative magnitudes
and the directions of the escape-competition effect, the Schumpeterian effect, and
the technological-barrier effect. Nonetheless, results from the numerical exercise in
Section 1.4.3.1 confirm that the partial equilibrium results for given tA`u
4
`“1 and
B still hold in general equilibrium for a plausible parameterization. Furthermore,
tA`u
4
`“1 and B also decrease after an exogenous increase in x.
1.2.7.3 Potential Startups












By using the value function derived in Proposition 1, the optimal probability of










The proof is in Appendix A.1.4.
As explained in the previous section, the total mass of domestic firms that
succeed in external innovation defines the portion of the aggregate creative destruc-
tion arrival rate accounted for by domestic firms. Since the optimal probabilities of
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external innovation for incumbent firms and potential domestic startups are equal to
x and xe respectively, the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate in this economy
is defined as




Since the mass of domestic incumbent firms Fd and the probabilities of external
innovation x and xe depend on x, an exogenous increase in xo doesn’t increase x by
the same amount in equilibrium. Thus, the level of x is endogenously determined
even when xo changes exogenously.
1.2.8 Growth rate
As equation (1.12) shows, the output growth rate in this model economy is
equal to the product quality growth rate g. Proposition 2 shows how this growth
rate is defined and decomposes it according to the contributions made by different
groups of firms and types of innovation.
Proposition 2. The growth rate for aggregate variables in a Balanced Growth Path
in this economy, g, is defined as
g “
”














p1´ xqp1´ z4q `∆2pz4 ` xp1´ z4qq
ı
µp∆4q ´ 1 . (1.25)
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Furthermore, g can be decomposed into four components:
1` g “
”





























internal innovation by both domestic incumbents and foreign firms












external innovation by domestic incumbent firms




























external innovation by foreign firms
.
Proof: See Appendix A.1.5.1
1.2.9 Firm Distribution
As the differentiated product firm’s decision rules show, the distribution of
firms’ technology gaps completely describes the distribution of firms in this model
economy.10 In this section, I describe how I keep track of the evolution of this
distribution. Denote the technology gap composition for a firm with nf product
lines and with n`f products with technology gap equal to ∆









f q, and the density of this object as µpN q.
10The technology gap distribution can be computed from this distribution.
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1.2.9.1 Technology Gap Portfolio Composition Distribution Transi-
tion
Define the technology gap portfolio composition for a firm with nf´k products
with ∆ “ ∆1, k products with ∆ “ ∆2, zero products with ∆ “ ∆3 and zero
products with ∆ “ ∆4 as rN pnf , kq ” pnf , nf ´k, k, 0, 0q, for k P r0, nf sXZ, nf ą 0.
Then without considering external innovation, the probability of N “ rN pnf , kq
becoming N 1 “ rN pnf ,rkq can be computed as
rP
´






















































































for nf ě 1, and
















is a combination of selecting k elements from n elements without repetition, where
the order of selection does not matter. Thus changes in the technology gap composi-
tion follow a binomial process, which is one of the novel features that Ates and Saffie
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(2016) introduced as a discrete time mapping of the continuous time endogenous
firm growth literature. The range for rk1 is of the form described as above due to
the fact that
i. For 0 ď rk ď mintnf ´ k, ku, the two combinations are well defined for any
rk1 P r0,rks X Z and describe all the possible cases.
ii. For nf ´ k ě k, k̃ ą k, 0 ď rk ´ rk
1, and 0 ď rk1 ď nf ´ k should be satisfied.
Thus rk ´ k ď rk1 ď rk.
iii. For k ě nf ´ k, rk ą nf ´ k, 0 ď rk ´ rk
1, and 0 ď rk1 ď nf ´ k should be
satisfied. Thus maxt0, rk ´ ku ď rk1 ď nf ´ k.
Since product lines can have technology gap equal to ∆3 or ∆4 only through ex-
ternal innovation, the probability of a technology gap compositionN “ pnf , n1f , n2f , n3f , n4f q
becoming N 1 “ pn1f , n11f , n21f , n31f , n41f q for any n1f ď nf ` 1 can be computed using
rPpnf ,rk |nf , kq, and with this, the change in the technology gap portfolio composition
distribution can be tracked. The procedure is described in detail in Appendix A.1.6.
1.2.9.2 Technology Gap Distribution
By using the distribution of the firm-level technology gap composition for
domestic firms Fd µpN q, the aggregate distribution for the technology gap for the

































Since this distribution is for the product lines owned by domestic firms, it should
sum up to the total mass of product lines owned by domestic firms. Denote the
total mass of product lines owned by domestic firms as sd. Lemma 2 describes its
relationship with the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate x in a stationary
equilibrium:
Lemma 2. In a stationary equilibrium, the total mass of product lines owned by
domestic firms is equal to the share of the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate


















Since domestic incumbent firms and foreign firms operating in domestic markets
are symmetric in terms of their R&D and production technology, their technology
gap distribution should differ only by a constant multiple. Thus the aggregate





















1.2.9.3 Aggregate Variables and Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium
Given the optimal innovation decision rules, aggregate domestic R&D expenses
















where It∆j“∆` , jPDu is an indicator function equal to one if product line j belongs
to a domestic firm with technology gap equal to ∆`. Also, using the optimal differ-
entiated product production rule, the total final goods used as inputs by domestic










qj ItjPDu dj .
Since R&D expenses and differentiated product production costs are paid with final
goods, aggregate consumption becomes
C “ Y ´Rd ´ Yd . (1.28)











qj ItjRDu dj .
Since there is no government expenditure, the Gross Domestic Production (GDP)
in this economy is
GDP “ Y ´ Yo .
With these aggregate variables defined, I can define the equilibrium of this economy:
Definition 1 (Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium). A balanced growth path equi-
librium of this economy consists of y˚j , p
˚
j , w
˚, L˚, x˚, tz`˚u4`“1, x
˚, x˚e , F˚d , R˚d, Y ˚,
C˚, g˚, µpN q, trµp∆`qu4`“1 for every j P r0, 1s with qj such that: (i) y˚j and p˚j satisfy
(1.11) and (1.8); (ii) wage rate w˚ satisfies (1.9); (iii) total labor for final good
production L˚ satisfies (1.10); (iv) the probabilities of internal innovation tz`˚u4`“1
satisfy (1.18), (1.19), (1.20), and (1.21), and the probability of external innova-
tion by incumbents x˚ satisfies (1.22); (v) the aggregate creative destruction arrival
rate x˚ satisfies (1.24); (vi) the probability of external innovation of potential star-
tups x˚e satisfies (1.23); (vii) aggregate output Y
˚ satisfies (1.12); (viii) aggregate
R&D expense R˚d satisfies (1.27); (ix) aggregate consumption C
˚ satisfies (1.28);
(x) the BGP growth rate g˚ satisfies (1.25); (xi) the invariant distribution of the
technology gap portfolio composition µpN q and the total mass of domestic firms F˚d
satisfy inflow(N ) = outflow(N ); and (xii) the invariant technology gap distribution
trµp∆`qu4`“1 satisfies (1.26).
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Period 1Period 0 Period 2
External innovation 














1 and 2 owned 











• All firms exit
News about shock to
period 2 profit
Figure 1.2: Timeline for the Simple Model Economy
1.3 Simple Three-Period Heterogeneous Innovation Model
To understand firms’ incentives for internal and external innovation, and to
derive empirically testable model predictions, in this section I consider a simplified
three-period economy with two product markets and three firms. In period 0, the
economy starts with two product markets, market 1 and 2, with initial market-
specific technologies q1,0 and q2,0 and two firms, A and B. Product market 1 is given
to firm A and is ready for production. Firm A is also given an initial probability
z1,0 of internally innovating product 1. Firm B, on the other hand, is given only a
probability x2,0 of externally innovating product 2. Thus, firm B can start operating
and producing in period 1 but not in period 0. If external innovation fails, then firm
B still keeps market 2 but produces with initial product quality q2,0. Thus, at the
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λ q1,0 with probability z1,0










η q2,0 with probability x2,0
q2,0 with probability 1´ x2,0 .
where λ2 ą η ą λ ą 1 are innovation step sizes.
In period 1, the main period of interest, there is a foreign firm (either from
a foreign country or different sector/state) that does external innovation hoping to
take over the two product markets in period 2. The outside firm succeeds in doing
external innovation with probability xo in each product market. Also, there is a news
shock about period 2 profit (such as an increase in foreign demand) announced in
period 1. Afterwards, the two incumbent firms produce using the given technologies,
invest in internal innovation to improve the quality of their own products, and invest
in external innovation to take over the other firm’s product market. At the beginning
of period 2, all innovation outcomes are realized. Then, technological competition
in each product market takes place, and the firm with the highest technology in
each market produces. The economy ends after period 2. Figure 1.2 summarizes
the timing.
In period 1, incumbent firm i P tA,Bu invests Rinj,1 on internal innovation,
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Successful internal innovation increases the next-period product quality by λ ą 1.









λ qj,1 with probability zj,1
qj,1 with probability 1´ zj,1 .
Similarly, firm i invests Rex´j,1 to learn the period 0 technology used by firm ´i ‰ i,










where ´j is owned by ´i. Successful external innovation increases product quality
relative to the past-period quality by η ą 1. Thus, product ´j’s quality in period 2









η q´j,0 with probability x´j,1
∅ with probability 1´ x´j,1 ,
where ∅ means firm i failed to acquire a production technology for product ´j.
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1.3.1 Optimal Innovation Decisions and Theoretical Predictions
Assume that in each product market j in each period t, firms receive instanta-
neous profit of πj,t qj,t where qj,t is the product quality and πj,t is a market-period-
specific constant known to firms before each period begins. Because there are only
two products, incumbents and the foreign firm can perform external innovation on
the same product. To keep the model simple, further assume that the foreign firm
can do external innovation only if an incumbent fails to do external innovation, fol-
lowing Garcia-Macia et al. (2019). Then the profit maximization problem of firm i
that has product market j with quality qj,1 in period 1 can be written as














































































xj,1 ` p1´ xj,1q xo
‰
„
zj,1πj,2 λ qj,1 Itλqj,1 ą ηqj,0u
`1
2




p1´ z´j,1q π´j,2 η q´j,0 Itηq´j,0 ą q´j,1u
`z´j,1 π´j,2 η q´j,0 Itηq´j,0 ąλq´j,1u
`1
2
p1´ z´j,1qπ´j,2ηq´j,0 Itηq´j,0 “ q´j,1u
`1
2






































































where It¨u is an indicator function that captures the possible relationships between
the two technologies among the three firms in period 2 in a given market. The first
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line shows the period 1 profit net of the total R&D cost. The second line represents
the incumbent’s period 2 expected profit from market j when the other incumbent
and the outside firm fail to externally innovate the market j technology. The third
and the fourth line represent the period 2 expected profit from market j when one of
the two other firms succeeds in externally innovating the market j technology. The
fifth to eighth lines represent the period 2 expected profit from market ´j when firm
i succeeds in externally innovating the market ´j technology. The terms following
1
2
are for the cases in which two firms can produce the same quality product, so that
a coin-toss tiebreaker rule applies.































λ´ p1´ x˚j,1qp1´ xoq
‰






































, when q´j,1 “ q´j,0
η π´j,2
2 rχ





p1´ z˚´j,1q , when q´j,1 “ η q´j,0 .
The above results show that the firm’s optimal innovation decisions depend on the
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(expected) future profit, the technology gap in both its own market and the other
firm’s market, and other firms’ internal and external innovation decisions. From
these interior solutions, I draw the following results.
Proposition 3. For each qj,1 and for λ








































Proof: See Appendix A.2.1
The second part of proposition 3 implies that firms with no technology gap
lower their internal innovation investment when they are faced with a higher prob-
ability of creative destruction in their own markets, as they cannot increase the
probability of escaping competition by improving their products through internal
innovation. On the other hand, if a firm has very high technological advantage, then
it doesn’t increase its internal innovation investment much in response to increased’
investment in external innovation by the foreign firm, because the probability of
losing its own product market is small. In the intermediate case, firms increase
their internal innovation investment more strongly in response to higher external
innovation by the foreign firm, as they can substantially lower the probability of
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losing their markets by doing so.
More successful innovation in period 0 increases the probability of having a
high technology gap in period 1, and this helps firms to escape competition. To
understand how past innovation intensity affects the firm’s current internal inno-
vation decision when the firm is faced with a higher probability of encountering a




































comes from the fact that there are two products. Then, proposition 3 gives
us:
Corollary 3 (Escape Competition Effect). The impacts of period 0 innovation
intensities, z1,0 and x2,0 on the expected response of internal innovation in period 1
to foreign competition satisfy:
Bz˚1
BxoBz1,0




Proof: See Appendix A.2.2
Corollary 3 implies that intensive innovation in the previous period induces
firms to increase the response of their current internal innovation to higher product
market competition.
47
As the optimal decision rule shows, firms’ external innovation decision also
depends on the past innovation decisions of other firms:
Proposition 4. For each qj,1 and for λ







































Proof: See Appendix A.2.1
Proposition 4 implies that firms do less external innovation if other firms have
a higher technology advantage, as it becomes more difficult to take over their mar-
kets through external innovation. For product markets with a technological barrier
(technology gap ą 1), firms also lower their external innovation if the outside firm
does more external innovation, as incumbents in these markets will respond by doing
more internal innovation with a defensive motive (proposition 3). To understand
how the past innovation intensity of other firms affects a firm’s current external



































Then, the first part of proposition 4 implies the following:
Corollary 4 (Technological Barrier Effect). For a given technology qj,1 and
period 0 innovation intensities, z1,0 and x2,0, we have
Bx˚1
Bz1,0




Proof: See Appendix A.2.3
Corollary 4 implies that higher technology levels in other markets, due to previous
innovation, serve as an effective technological barrier that makes it difficult for a firm
to take over another firm’s product market. This reduces firms’ incentive for external
innovation. Because innovation is forward looking, changes in future profit π1 are
an important factor affecting current period innovation intensity. Proposition 5
summarizes this:




ą 0 , @ qj,1 , and
Bx˚j,1
Bπj,2




for other technology gaps are ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix A.2.4
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Proposition 5 implies that any factor that affects future profits may affect
firms’ internal and external innovation. These include market size changes (such
as an opportunity to access foreign markets), changes in input costs, and the fu-
ture survival probability. More specifically, an increase in the expected profit from
one’s own market induces firms to increase their internal innovation. However, the
effect of increasing expected profit in other markets on firms’ external innovation
is ambiguous for cases with technology gap ą 1. This is because incumbents in
these markets increase their internal innovation in response to increasing expected
profit, and this helps them escape competition. For the case with technology gap
“ 1, incumbents cannot escape competition through internal innovation. Thus,
an increase in expected future profit unambiguously increases external innovation
for this case. The above results outline various factors affecting internal, external,
and total innovation. These predictions can be tested empirically, once we have a
well-measured shock to competitive pressure in the data.
1.4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, I calibrate the model to the average characteristics of the U.S.
manufacturing sector from 1987 to 1997, and study how an increase in competitive
pressure by foreign firms affects U.S. firms’ innovation decisions. Then, I run the
same exercise in a model economy where external innovation is much more expen-
sive than the U.S., and compare the results with those from the previous exercise.
This comparison highlights how the same competitive pressure shock can lead to a
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decrease in overall innovation in an economy with high creativity (an economy with
less expensive external innovation), and an increase in overall innovation in an econ-
omy with low creativity (an economy with expensive external innovation). Lastly,
I run an exercise in which I reduce the cost of external innovation by potential
startups, which increases competitive pressure by domestic entrants.
1.4.1 Solution Algorithm
Since tz`u4`“1 are functions of x; g is a function of x, tz
`u4`“1, and tµp∆
`qu4`“1;
x is a function of x and tµp∆`qu4`“1; xe is a function of x and tµp∆
`qu4`“1; and x is a
function of Fd, x, and xe, I solve for an equilibrium of the model by iterating over
the value for the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate x.
1.4.1.0.1 Solution Algorithm
i) Guess a value for x and the technology gap portfolio composition distribution
µpN q, which imply a technology gap distribution tµp∆`qu4`“1 and total mass
of domestic firms Fd.




iii) Using the guesses for µpN q, tµp∆`qu4`“1, and Fd,
a) Compute g, x, B, and xe.
b) Compute stationary µ8pN q, thus tµ8p∆`qu4`“1, using the guesses for
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Table 1.1: Parameter Estimates
# Parameter Description Value Identification
1. β time discount rate 0.9615 annual interest rate of 4%
2. pψ curvature of internal R&D 2 Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
3. rψ curvature of external R&D 2 Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
4. rψe curvature of external R&D, startup 2 Akcigit and Kerr (2018)
5. θ quality share in final goods production 0.109 data
6. pχ scale of internal R&D 0.042 indirect inference
7. rχ scale of external R&D 1.184 indirect inference
8. rχe scale of external R&D, startup 7.696 indirect inference
9. λ quality multiplier of internal innovation 0.021 indirect inference
10. η quality multiplier of external innovation 0.038 indirect inference
11. xo exogenous foreign c.d. arrival rate 0.045 indirect inference
µpN q, innovation decision rules and the relationship
Fd,n`1 µn`1pN q “ Fd,n µnpN q ` inflownpN q ´ outflownpN q .
c) Compute g8, x8, B8, and xe8 using µ8pN q, and tµ8p∆`qu4`“1.
iv) Compute x1 “ Fd,8 x8 ` Ed xe8 .
v) If x ‰ x1, set x “ x1, and µpN q “ µ8pN q, use them as new guesses, and return
to ii).
vi) iterate ii) to v) until convergence of x.
1.4.2 Calibration
The eleven structural parameters of the model listed in Table 1.1 are calibrated
in two ways. The first group of five parameters is externally calibrated according
to the literature and the data. The second group of six parameters is internally
calibrated to firm level data and the import penetration ratio in the U.S. manufac-
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turing sector from 1987 to 1997.11 A sample of firms is drawn from the universe
of innovative manufacturing firms in the 1987 through 1997 censuses.12 The total
mass of potential domestic startups (Ed) is set equal to one.
1.4.2.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters
The time discount factor (β) is set equal to 0.9615, which corresponds to an
annual interest rate of 4%. The curvatures of the three R&D cost functions ( pψ,
rψ, rψe) are taken from Akcigit and Kerr (2018) and their discussion of two lines
of literature: one evaluating the empirical relationship between patents and R&D
expenditure, and the other evaluating the impact of R&D tax credits on the R&D





df “ θ, where profits include R&D expenditures. Thus the quality share in
final goods production (θ) is set equal to the corresponding number from the data,
which is 10.9% for the 1982-1997 period according to Akcigit and Kerr (2018).
1.4.2.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters
The remaining six parameters are estimated using an indirect inference ap-
proach: for each set of six parameter values, I compute six model-generated mo-
ments, compare them to the moments from the data, and find a set of parameter
11The import penetration ratio in the manufacturing sector is defined as the ratio between the
manufacturing imports and the manufacturing value added net of exports plus imports. The man-
ufacturing imports and exports are from World Development Indicators, and the manufacturing
value added is from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
12Innovative firms are defined as firms with positive R&D expenditure or positive number of
patents filing. R&D to sales ratio, firm entry rate, and average sales growth rate are from Akcigit
and Kerr (2018), where sample period is from 1982 to 1997. The average number of products is
from Bernard et al. (2010), and the high-growth firm growth rate is from Decker et al. (2016).
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Table 1.2: Target Moments
Moment Data Model Moment Data Model
R&D to sales ratio (%) 4.1 4.1 avg. sales growth rate ( %) 1.0 1.0
avg. number of products 3.5 1.5 high-growth firm growth rate (%) 22.8 22.8
firm entry rate (%) 5.8 5.8 import penetration in manuf. (%) 37.4 37.4





















where the six moments are listed in Table 1.2 and discussed in depth next.
The six moments are chosen in consideration of both their importance in an-
swering the main question of this paper, and the relationships among the moments
and the parameters coming from the choice of functional forms in the model. Al-
though all the parameter values contribute substantially in determining the value
for each model-generated moment, the tight relationship between certain sub-groups
of parameters and moments can be noted.
Firms perform internal and external R&D to adjust the number of product
lines they operate. Since R&D cost is one of the important factors in determining
the level of R&D intensity, and hence the number of product lines the firm owns, I
discipline the scale of internal R&D (pχ) and the scale of external R&D (rχ) through
the R&D to sales ratio and the average number of products firms own.
Potential startups learn and improve existing technologies to enter the market,
and the success probability of entry is tightly related to the level of R&D expenditure
(cost) they spend. Thus I discipline the scale of external R&D for startups (rχe) using
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the firm entry rate.
Firms grow in terms of both sales and number of employees by improving the
qualities of their existing products and/or adding new product lines to their product
line portfolios. How fast/slow they can grow depends on how much improvement
they can achieve in product quality. Thus I discipline the quality multiplier of
internal innovation (λ) and the quality multiplier of external innovation (η) through
the average sales growth rate and high-growth firms’ (the 90th percentile firm of the
firm employment growth distribution) employment growth rate—the key moment
in this paper.
Finally, I discipline the initial value for the exogenous foreign creative destruc-
tion arrival rate xo using the import penetration ratio in the manufacturing sector,
as the exogenous foreign creative destruction arrival rate is tightly related to the
share of domestic differentiated product markets occupied by the foreign exporters.
Table 1.2 reports the model generated moments. The model matches the tar-
get moments very closely, except for the average number of products. This manifests
the drawbacks coming from the assumption that firms can make only one external
innovation at a time. It becomes very hard for a firm to add one more product line as
its number of product lines increases. Roughly speaking, the probability of adding
one more product line for a firm with nf product lines is equal to xtakeoverxp1´xq
nf ,
without considering internal innovation. Bar graphs in figure 1.3 with solid lines
show the distribution of the number of product lines (product line distribution) and
the technology gap distribution computed using the parameter values reported in
Table 1.1. As we can see, the product line distribution resembles a Pareto distribu-
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Figure 1.3: Firm Distribution and Technology Gap Distribution Changes
tion. Roughly 60% of the product lines have a technology gap equal to one under the
calibrated parameter values. This might be another symptom of problems arising
from the assumption of only one external innovation at a time, and it influences the
level of the technological-barrier effect in the quantitative analysis.
1.4.3 Counterfactual Exercises
1.4.3.1 Increasing Competitive Pressure From Foreign Firms
In this section, I assess the impact of increasing competitive pressure from
foreign firms on individual firms’ behavior, particularly their overall innovation,
composition of innovation, and the employment growth rate using the calibrated
model. More specifically, I increase the value of xo from 0.045 to 0.054 (20% in-
crease). This is equivalent to an increase in the import penetration ratio in the U.S.
manufacturing sector from 37.4% to 43.5% (6.1% increase).
To understand the effects of rising competitive pressure from foreign firms at
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Table 1.3: Innovation Intensities Changes
description variables before after % change
foreign creative destruction arrival rate xo 0.045 0.054 20.00%
creative destruction arrival rate x 0.120 0.123 2.98%
prob. of internal innovation (∆1 “ 1) z1 0.224 0.224 -0.03%
prob. of internal innovation (∆2 “ λ) z2 0.653 0.656 0.60%
prob. of internal innovation (∆3 “ η) z3 0.453 0.456 0.54%
prob. of internal innovation (∆4 “ ηλ) z
4 0.438 0.440 0.44%
prob. of external innovation, incumbents x 0.097 0.095 -2.20%
prob. of external innovation, potential startups xe 0.033 0.032 -3.33%
conditional takeover probability xtakeover 0.747 0.746 -0.23%
unconditional takeover probability xtakeover 0.073 0.071 -2.43%
the firm level, Table 1.3 reports changes in variables related to innovation intensity.
An exogenous increase in the foreign creative destruction arrival rate xo increases the
aggregate creative destruction arrival rate. As reported in Table 1.5, the expected
profits from internal innovation and production (tA`u
4
`“1) and external innovation
(B) decrease. These have negative Schumpeterian effects on firms’ incentives for
internal and external innovation. However, the escape-competition effect dominates
for product lines with positive technology gaps. Thus, incumbent firms attempt to
protect their existing product lines by increasing their internal innovation intensity
for product lines with technology gap higher than one, where the relative magni-
tudes of changes are in alignment with Corollary 2. Due to this increased internal
innovation intensity and the heightened overall external innovation intensity—the
higher value for the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate—the technology gap
distribution changes, as reported in Table 1.4 and shown in Figure 1.3 graphically.
Along with increased probabilities of internal innovation, this change in the tech-
nology gap distribution towards higher densities of ∆3 and ∆4 lowers the value of
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Table 1.4: Technology Gap Distribution Change
description variables before after % change
Technology gap distribution (shares)
∆1 “ 1 0.613 0.612 -0.10%
∆2 “ λ 0.303 0.301 -0.55%
∆3 “ η 0.072 0.074 2.93%
∆4 “ ηλ 0.012 0.013 1.34%
xtakeover, the conditional takeover probability, which is what I call the technological-
barrier effect. Both the Schumpeterian effect and the technological-barrier effect
affect firms’ incentive for external innovation negatively. Therefore, firms optimally
lower their investment in external innovation. Recall that the probability of external






















Thus we can decompose the changes in x into two parts: one resulting from the
Schumpeterian effect and the other from the technological-barrier effect. Holding the
expected future profits fixed at their initial levels, I find that 10.3% of the changes in
x are due to the technological-barrier effect. Similarly, potential startups’ external
innovation intensity also drops, and this drives the decrease in the total mass of
domestic startups.
The change in the technology gap distribution is affected by the assumption
of only one external innovation at a time. Firms can have a product line with
technology gap equal to either ∆3 or ∆4 only through external innovation. Since
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Table 1.5: Firm Value Change
description variables before after % change
Firm Values
A1 0.290 0.283 -2.18%
A2 0.305 0.299 -2.00%
A3 0.313 0.307 -1.95%
A4 0.295 0.289 -2.11%
B 0.393 0.377 -4.03%
incumbent firms are allowed to add only one product line per period, a large share
of product lines with technology gap equal to ∆3 or ∆4 belong to startups (both
domestic and foreign). Thus the share of product lines with technology gap equal
to ∆3 or ∆4 increases more than that of ∆2 after an increase in the total mass of
potential startups from the foreign country. I conjecture this is the reason why I see
a drop in the share of product lines with ∆2 despite a general increase in internal
innovation intensity. This change in the technology gap distribution is one of the
reasons for the mild decrease in the conditional takeover probability xtakeover.
Table 1.6 reports changes in some of the model generated moments. Impor-
tantly, the R&D to sales ratio drops as a result of increasing competitive pressure
from foreign firms. This is because external innovation falls by more than the in-
crease in internal innovation. Consequently, the external R&D intensity, measured
as the ratio of total domestic R&D expenses for external innovation to total domes-
tic R&D expenses for all innovation, also drops. The total masses of both domestic
firms and domestic startups decrease. However, the total mass of domestic firms de-
creases by more, so that the domestic firm entry rate increases. The average number
of products for each firm decreases after an increase in competitive pressure from
foreign firms. This is in alignment with wthe empirical findings ofhat Bernard et
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Table 1.6: Domestic Firm Entry, Exit, and Other Moments
description before after % change
R&D to sales ratio (%) 4.124 4.064 -1.46%
external R&D intensity (%) 50.774 49.910 -1.70%
total mass of domestic firms 0.429 0.393 -8.23%
total mass of domestic startups 0.025 0.024 -3.56%
domestic firm entry rate (%) 5.833 6.130 5.09%
avg. number of products 1.461 1.435 -1.78%
avg. sales growth rate (%) 1.048 1.058 0.93%
Table 1.7: Aggregate Growth Decomposition
description before after % change
aggregate growth (1+g) 1.0105 1.0106 0.01%
growth from internal innovation 0.9179 0.9154 -0.27%
growth from domestic external innovation 0.0322 0.0288 -10.45%
growth from domestic startups 0.0258 0.0249 -3.56%
growth from foreign external innovation 0.0346 0.0414 19.72%
growth from domestic firms 0.9759 0.9692 -0.69%
al. (2011). Using the U.S. Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database
and the U.S. Census of Manufactures, they find that firms experiencing higher tar-
iff reductions after the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement reduce the number of
products they produce relative to firms experiencing smaller tariff reductions. The
average firm sales growth rate, which is equal to the aggregate growth rate g in
the model economy, increases after an increase in competitive pressure from foreign
firms. This increase, however, is completely driven by foreign exporters. Table 1.7
reports the decomposition of the change in the aggregate growth rate. After sub-
tracting the contribution accounted for by foreign exporters, the aggregate growth
accounted for by domestic firms falls by 0.69% after an increase in competitive
pressure from foreign firms.
Lastly, Table 1.8 shows the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the employment-
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Table 1.8: Firm Employment Growth Rate Changes
description before after
p90 emp. growth rate (%) 22.843 20.997
p50 emp. growth rate (%) 0.254 0.246
p10 emp. growth rate (%) -12.151 -12.082
weighted distribution of firm employment growth rates before and after the increase
in competitive pressure from foreign firms. The growth rate of high-growth firms,
measured as the 90th percentile of the distribution, decreases from 22.8% to 21.0%
after an increase in competitive pressure from foreign firms. The 50th percentile
decreases after the increase in competitive pressure from foreign firms. The 10th
percentile, however, increases, because firms are better at protecting their product
markets with increased internal innovation.
1.4.3.2 Comparison I: Economy with High External Innovation Cost
To show how the effect of the same-sized shock to competitive pressure changes
if we consider an economy with low creativity—a low external innovation intensity
due to increased frictions—I run the same exercise of increasing creative destruction
arrival rate by outside firms, xo, by 20%, in an economy in which rχ, the parameter
governing the cost of external R&D is 50 times higher than the baseline calibration
of 1.184.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1.9 compare this low creativity economy with the
economy calibrated to the U.S. (baseline calibration with rχ = 1.184). As we can
see, this economy is less dynamic compared to the U.S., with lower R&D, a lower
number of startups, lower economic growth, and lower high-growth firm growth than
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Table 1.9: Moment Comparison: U.S. vs. Economy with High External Innov. Cost
Moment Baseline w/ high ext. innov. cost after shock % change
R&D to sales ratio (%) 4.124 1.451 1.480 2.02
avg. number of products 1.461 1.022 1.019 -0.31
total mass of domestic firms 0.429 0.355 0.300 -15.43
total mass of domestic startups 0.025 0.020 0.019 -7.39
avg. sales growth rate ( %) 1.011 0.842 0.867 2.96
p90 emp. growth rate (%) 22.843 9.111 9.089 -0.24
the baseline economy.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1.9 compare the moments of the low creativity
economy before and after an increase in competitive pressure from foreign firms.
Compared to the U.S. counterparts, all the moments except for the R&D to sales
ratio move in the same direction, but the magnitudes are smaller. Importantly, the
domestic R&D to sales ratio increases in this economy, whereas this ratio decreases
in the baseline model. In this economy, firms put very little effort into external in-
novation. Thus, although external innovation decreases after an increase in foreign
competitive pressure, the reduction is very small in absolute terms. Therefore it is
more than offset by increased investment for internal innovation for defensive rea-
sons. This result highlights the importance of examining changes in the composition
of innovation along with changes in the overall amount of innovation.
Table 1.10 shows changes in innovation intensities. Compared to the numbers
reported in Table 1.3, we see that innovation intensities are smaller in magnitude in
the economy with low creativity. However, the direction of changes in response to
increasing competitive pressure from foreign firms are identical in both economies.
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Table 1.10: Innov. Intensities Changes in an Economy w/ High Ext. Innov. Cost
description variables before after % change
foreign creative destruction arrival rate xo 0.045 0.054 20.00%
creative destruction arrival rate x 0.070 0.077 10.10%
prob. of internal innovation (∆1 “ 1) z1 0.225 0.224 -0.14%
prob. of internal innovation (∆2 “ λ) z2 0.581 0.594 2.24%
prob. of internal innovation (∆3 “ η) z3 0.411 0.418 1.76%
prob. of internal innovation (∆4 “ ηλ) z
4 0.403 0.409 1.57%
prob. of external innovation, incumbents x 0.003 0.003 -6.43%
prob. of external innovation, potential startups xe 0.024 0.023 -6.67%
conditional takeover probability xtakeover 0.831 0.825 -0.78%
unconditional takeover probability xtakeover 0.003 0.002 -7.16%
1.4.3.3 Comparison II: Increased Competitive Pressure From Domes-
tic Startups
In this exercise, I lower rχe, the parameter governing the cost of external R&D
for potential startups, by 11.34%. This increases the aggregate creative destruction
arrival rate x from 0.120 to 0.123 (a 2.98% increase), which is identical to the
increase in the previous exercise due to increasing the foreign creative destruction
arrival rate by 20%.
Table 1.11 shows the results. Since the aggregate creative destruction arrival
rate is the same, all the moments related to individual incumbent firms are virtually
identical to the numbers reported in Tables 1.8, 1.6, and 1.3. However, the total
mass of domestic firms, the total mass of domestic startups, and the probability of
external innovation by potential startups increase in this case. This is because the
increasing competitive pressure is induced by an increase in the mass of domestic
startups, rather than by foreign firms. This exercise shows that changes in moments
related to the number of domestic firms and startups are keys for identifying whether
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Table 1.11: Changes in Moments: Economy with Low Entry Cost
description before after % change
total mass of domestic firms 0.429 0.444 3.54%
total mass of domestic startups 0.025 0.027 8.83%
R&D to sales ratio (%) 4.124 4.065 -1.44%
avg. number of products 1.461 1.435 -1.78%
avg. sales growth rate (%) 1.048 1.058 0.92%
p90 emp. growth rate (%) 22.843 20.997 -8.08%
prob. of external innovation, potential startups 0.033 0.037 9.08%
an increase in competitive pressure is coming from the domestic entry margin or
foreign firm entry.
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate the effect of competition on the level and compo-
sition of innovation by developing an endogenous growth model with heterogeneous
innovation and imperfect technology spillovers. Firms improve their own product
quality and production processes through internal innovation and use external inno-
vation to get into new markets and drive incumbent firms out. External innovation,
however, is subject to imperfect technology spillovers, in that it takes time to learn
others’ technology.
This chapter shows that having different types of innovation and imperfect
technology spillovers are crucial in analyzing the effect of increasing competition on
firm innovation. Increasing competition lowers firms’ incentive to invest in external
innovation while it encourages investment in internal innovation for product lines
with a large technology gap accumulated through recent innovation.
This chapter also shows that the decomposition of innovation into two types
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is also potentially important in understanding the differential effect of competition
on firm innovation across firms in different sectors or countries. The direction of
incumbent firms’ responses of internal and external innovation to competition is
similar regardless of the cost of external innovation. However, overall innovation,
which combines internal and external innovation, increases in an economy with high
external innovation costs in response to increased competition, while it decreases
in an economy with low external innovation costs, such as the U.S. This is because
firms do very little external innovation in an economy with high external innovation
costs even before an increase in competition, which implies that there is very little
room for further downward adjustment. Thus, the decrease in external innovation
is completely dominated by an increase in internal innovation.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop an endogenous
growth model incorporating an escape-competition effect where firms are allowed to
grow through product scope expansion à la Klette and Kortum (2004) with firm
entry and exit. Additionally, my model can explain why the change in overall
innovation in response to increasing competition can differ across countries with
different fundamentals.
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Globalization on Firm Innovation and Firm
Growth in the U.S.
2.1 Introduction
The past decades have seen declining business dynamism in the U.S. economy
in various measures, such as startup rates, job creation and destruction rates, and
activity among high-growth firms, a significant portion of which are young firms
(Decker et al., 2014). In the manufacturing sector, for example, the startup rate fell
from 8.3% in 1992 to 6.3% in 2007, whereas the employment growth rate of the top
decile of firm employment growth declined from 22.5% in 1992 to 17.0% in 2007.1
Startups and high-growth firms account for 70% of gross job creation in typical years
(Decker et al., 2014).2 Furthermore, high-growth firms also play disproportionately
important roles in output growth and productivity growth (Haltiwanger et al., 2016).
Thus, the decline in startup rates and the activity of high-growth young firms is a
large concern.
1The startup rates are Author’s calculation from the Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS).
The top-decile firm is the 90th percentile firm of the employment-weighted distribution of firm
employment growth rates. The two employment growth rates are based on Hodrick-Prescott trend,
where data is from Decker et al. (2016). Economy-wide, the two numbers changed from 32.8% in
1992 to 26.3% in 2007.
2Here, high-growth firms are defined as firms with employment growth rate more than 25% per
year.
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Simultaneously, the U.S. economy experienced increasing international trade.
Exports of goods and services, for example, rose from 8.0% of GDP in 1992 to 11.5%
in 2007, and the import penetration ratio rose from 9.2% in 1992 to 15.5% in 2007.3
While a significant body of research has examined the link between international
trade and macroeconomic outcomes such as output growth and unemployment, less
attention has been paid to the impact of international trade on high-growth firm
activity.
In this chapter, I argue that the decline in high-growth firm activity and
startup rates in the U.S. is a result of multi-product firms’ optimal innovation deci-
sions in response to increasing competitive pressure from foreign firms due to glob-
alization. I do this by building on the theoretical predictions developed in Chapter
1. The first prediction of my model is that firms who have innovated intensively in
recent periods increase internal innovation more when they are faced with higher
competition, compared to their low innovation counterparts. The second predic-
tion is that firms do less external innovation if other firms have innovated more
intensively in recent periods. The third prediction is that firms do more internal
innovation if they expect to get higher profits from their current product markets
in the near future.
Thus, increasing competitive pressure from foreign firms induces innovation-
intensive (and thus high-growth) firms to focus their innovative effort on improving
3Import penetration ratio is defined as the imports of goods and services divided by the total
expenditure on goods and services, measured as the GDP minus the exports of goods and services
plus the imports of goods and services. Both exports of goods and services per GDP, and import
penetration ratio is the author’s calculation from FRED economic data in real terms, then Hodrick-
Prescott trends are reported. Exports of goods and services per total expenditure rose from 7.9%
in 1992 to 11.0% in 2007
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their existing products to defend themselves from competitors rather than expanding
their market scope.4 And because innovative incumbents devote more effort to
protecting their markets with heightened technological barriers, all types of firms,
including highly innovative firms and potential startups, find it difficult to enter into
others’ markets through external innovation. Thus, the startup rate falls, and all
firms reduce their investment in external innovation. Furthermore, because external
innovation makes firms grow faster than internal innovation, this shift of innovation
activity causes innovation-intensive firms to grow more slowly.5
I first test the three model predictions empirically. To do so, I construct a
unique data by combining firm-level datasets from the U.S. Census Bureau with
patent data from the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) from
1976 to 2016. This comprehensive dataset has information for the population of
U.S. patenting firms, such as employment, international transactions, and the 6-digit
NAICS industries in which each firm operates. I use China’s WTO accession in 2001
as an exogenous change in competitive pressure from foreign firms, use the patent
self-citation ratio as a measure of the likelihood each patent is used for internal
innovation, and provide regression results consistent with the first model prediction.
4Graham et al. (2018) show that compared to non-patenting firms, patenting firms on average
grow three percentage points faster, and young patenting firms grow even faster. Also, they shed
fewer jobs compared to non-patenting counterparts. Acemoglu et al. (2018) show that among
innovative firms, young and small firms have higher innovation intensity than mature firms as
measured by the ratio of R&D spending to sales.
5Akcigit and Kerr (2018) empirically show that external innovation generates more forward
citations and is associated with higher employment growth compared to internal innovation. They
also show, through the lens of their structural model, that external innovation brings higher product
quality improvement, and contributes more to economic growth. They use patenting firms in the
Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) from 1982 to 1997 to arrive at these conclusions both
theoretically and empirically. Bernard et al. (2010) suggest that product switching contributes
to a reallocation of resources within firms toward their most efficient use. Thus, experimentation
through external innovation is very important for firm growth.
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I also show that the positive association between patenting and employment growth
for innovation-intensive firms falls by one-third after an increase in competitive
pressure from foreign firms, as more patents are used for internal innovation. Next, I
find regression results consistent with the second model prediction by using changes
in foreign patent growth (in other words, the recent innovation activity of other
firms) as a measure of an exogenous variation in technological barriers. Finally, by
using log differences in advanced countries’ exports to China (excluding the U.S.)
as a proxy for exogenous changes in Chinese demand for U.S. products (an export
shock), I find regression results supporting the third model prediction.
To quantify the effect of the rise of China after 2001 on U.S. firms’ innovation
decisions and growth, I extend the baseline model developed in Chapter 1 into a
two-country framework. To my best knowledge, this is the first theoretical model
of defensive innovation with two countries that allows individual firms to grow both
by improving in their existing markets and by taking over other firms’ markets,
through two different types of innovation.
This two-country model shares the same features as the baseline model devel-
oped in Chapter 1, especially the importance of the technology gap in each product
market for the optimal internal innovation-decision rule. In the two-country exten-
sion, quality differences between the same products sold in different countries also
matter for firms’ internal innovation decisions. When international trade is costly,
similar quality products are not traded but instead are produced and consumed
domestically. This creates a global technology gap—the gap between a U.S. firm’s
technology and a foreign firm’s technology in each product market. Domestic in-
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cumbents with lagging technologies invest more in internal innovation if potential
foreign competitors in their markets have technology high enough that they could
overcome the trade cost and start exporting their products to the domestic market
by performing additional internal innovation. On the other hand, global technolog-
ical leaders also are motivated to perform internal innovation, which could enable
them to overcome the trade cost and become exporters. I find supporting empiri-
cal evidence for an enhanced internal innovation incentive for global technological
leaders.
Using my model, I perform a counterfactual exercise of reducing tariff rates
bilaterally by 4.16 percentage points, which is equal to the estimated reduction in
expected tariff rates faced by Chinese firms after 2001. I find that model firms, on av-
erage, shift their innovation activities toward more internal innovation after they are
exposed to higher international trade. This causes high-growth, innovation-intensive
firms to grow more slowly. Also, startup rates fall, as the increased technological
advantage accumulated by incumbent firms through internal innovation makes it
harder for startups to enter the economy through external innovation. I provide
industry-level regression results consistent with these predictions.
This chapter contributes to an emerging literature on the decline in business
dynamism in the U.S. Decker et al. (2014) and Decker et al. (2016) show that
business dynamism in the U.S. has been declining in various measures, and these
declines accelerated after 2000. Previous studies, such as Karahan et al. (2019)
and Hopenhayn et al. (2018), examine the effect of demographic changes on busi-
ness dynamism, while Akcigit and Ates (2019a,b) focus on the effect of declines in
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knowledge diffusion. To my knowledge, I am the first to propose increasing foreign
competition and U.S. firms’ endogenous changes in the allocation of innovative ac-
tivity as a channel that explains the decline in high-growth firm activity and startup
rates through the lens of a structural model, with supporting empirical evidence.
This chapter also contributes to the literature that investigates the impact of
international trade on firm innovation. Existing studies mainly combine internal
and external innovation and estimate the effect of trade on firms’ overall innovation.
The results are mixed. Bloom et al. (2016) show that surviving firms in developed
European countries fight Chinese import competition by increasing their overall
innovation. Autor et al. (2019), on the other hand, show that publicly traded U.S.
firms lower their overall innovation when firms are allowed to exit in the regression
sample. Aghion et al. (2017), meanwhile, focus on French exporters’ innovation
decisions when competition in the export market increases. They show that more
productive exporters do more innovation in response to increasing competition in
the export market, while less productive firms do less innovation.
Atkeson and Burstein (2010) theoretically investigate the effect of trade liber-
alization on firm innovation when incumbents do internal innovation while startups
are born with new products. In their model, the impact of trade on firm innovation
operates through wage changes, and is not heterogeneous across firms. This paper is
closely related to Akcigit et al. (2018), who build a two-country endogenous growth
model with internal step-by-step innovation. Similar to the model developed in this
paper, their model distinguishes the competition effect and the market size effect
on firm innovation. The difference is that, in my framework, firms are also allowed
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to grow through product scope expansion by taking over others’ markets. With
two types of innovation, firm growth can slow down even if firms increase internal
innovation to escape competition.
This chapter contributes to this large strand of literature in three ways. First,
I study the differential effect of international trade on two types of innovation, inter-
nal and external, that make asymmetric contributions to firm employment growth
and economic growth. This provides a potential explanation for the recent decline
in business dynamism in the U.S. economy. Second, I study why firms with different
initial characteristics can react differentially to the same trade shock, while explain-
ing the underlying mechanisms through a rich theoretical framework that allows us
to decompose the firm’s incentives for innovation in detail. And lastly, I empirically
study the effect of international trade on different types of firm innovation using a
population of patenting firms by matching the USPTO patent database to internal
Census Bureau datasets. To my own best knowledge, this project is the first to
accomplish these three objectives.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 presents empirical
results for the effect of international competition on the composition of firm in-
novation. Section 2.3 develops a two-country baseline general equilibrium model.
Section 2.4 presents results from quantitative analysis. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Empirics
In this section, I empirically examine the relationships among firm innovation,
firm growth, and international trade for firms with different characteristics. I identify
the causal effect of international trade on the composition of firm innovation (internal
vs. external) and test the predictions of the simplee three-period model developed
in Chapter 1. The analysis focuses on the early 1990s to mid-2000s, especially the
years after 2000, as this period witnessed changes in the trends for many important
economic variables, especially the employment growth rate of high-growth firms and
the number of patent applications filed by U.S. firms. The rise of China in the U.S.
markets after China’s WTO accession in 2001, and increased Chinese demand for
U.S. products, will be treated as quasi-experiments.
2.2.1 Data and Measurement
To construct a comprehensive firm-level dataset containing measures of inno-
vation and international trade, I combine the following seven datasets: the USPTO
PatentsView database, the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), the Longitu-
dinal Firm Trade Transactions Database (LFTTD), the Census of Manufactures
(CMF), the UN Comtrade Database, the NBER-CES database, and the tariff data
compiled by Feenstra et al. (2002).
The LBD tracks the universe of establishments and firms in the U.S. non-farm
private sector with at least one paid employee annually from 1976 onward.6 An
6Details for the LBD and its construction can be found in Jarmin and Miranda (2002).
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establishment corresponds to the physical location where business activity occurs.
Establishments that are operated by the same entity, identified through the Eco-
nomic Census and the Company Organization Survey, are grouped under a common
firm identifier. I aggregate establishment-level information into firm-level observa-
tions using these firm identifiers. Firm size is measured by either total employment
or total payroll. Firm age is based on the age of the oldest establishment of the firm
when the firm is first observed in the data. The firm’s main industry of operation
is based on the six-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
code associated with the highest level of employment. Time-consistent NAICS codes
for LBD establishments are constructed by Fort and Klimek (2018), and the 2012
NAICS codes are used throughout the entire analysis.
The LFTTD tracks all U.S. international trade transactions starting from 1992
onward at the firm level.7 The LFTTD provides the U.S. dollar value of shipments,
and the origin and destination country for each transaction, as well as a related-
party flag, which indicates whether the U.S. importer and the foreign exporter are
related by ownership of at least 6 percent.
The USPTO PatentsView database tracks all patents ultimately granted by
the USPTO from 1976 onward.8 This database contains detailed information for
granted patents including application and grant dates, technology class, other patents
cited, and the name and address of patent assignees. It also provides the list of in-
ventors responsible for each patent with their locations. In the following analyses, I
7Bernard et al. (2009) describe the LFTTD in greater detail.
8See http://www.patentsview.org/download/.
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use the citation-adjusted number of utility patent applications as the main measure
of firm innovation.9 By using detailed information for each patent, I distinguish
domestic innovation from foreign innovation, and measure the extent to which each
patent represents internal innovation. The year in which a patent application is
filed is used as a proxy for the innovation year. The citation-adjusted average of
the internal innovation measure for the flow of patent applications in each firm-year
is used as a proxy for the overall extent of internal innovation at each firm in each
year. I discuss the measure of internal innovation in detail shortly.
I match the USPTO patent database to the LBD to assign detailed firm-level
information and firm-industry-level changes in trade flows to each patent. In the
following analyses, I compare firms’ patenting behavior across different years. Thus,
match quality is important – failing to match a firm in the USPTO patent database
in a particular year to its LBD counterpart will result in mismeasuring innovation.
This problem arises because the USPTO doesn’t track a consistent unique firm ID.
The USPTO assigns patent applications to self-reported firm names. Thus, it is
vulnerable to misspelling of firm names. To overcome this match quality issue,
I adopt the Autor et al. (2019) methodology, which utilizes the machine-learning
capacities of the internet search engine. I use all patents granted up to December 26,
2017 during the matching procedure, and use patent applications up to 2007 in the
subsequent analyses. Thus, the following analyses are virtually free from the right
censoring issue (mismeasuring firms’ innovation activities due to patents applied for
9See Cohen (2010) for a comprehensive review of the literature on the determination of firms’
and industries’ innovative activity and performance and how patent-related measures are used.
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but not yet granted). Table B.4 in the Appendix reports summary statistics for
patenting firms in 1992.
The quinquennial CMF provides detailed information for activities by estab-
lishments in the manufacturing sector. It also provides detailed product codes and
breaks down the value of shipments for all products each establishment sells. I use
five-digit SIC codes for observations up to 1997, and seven-digit NAICS codes for
observations from 2002 onward, to measure firms’ product choices.
The UN Comtrade Database provides information for world trade flows at
the six-digit HS product-level from 1991 to 2016.10 The six-digit HS codes are
concorded to six-digit 2012 NAICS industries using the Pierce and Schott (2009,
2012) crosswalks. I construct an industry-level export shock measure using the
UN Comtrade Database. Also, I obtain U.S. tariff schedules from Feenstra et al.
(2002) to measure industry-level Trade Policy Uncertainty (TPU), which is used as
a measure of shocks to foreign competitive pressure. The construction of these two
trade shocks is discussed in detail in the following section.
The NBER CES Manufacturing Industry Database, assembled by Becker et
al. (2013), is used to obtain the industry-level deflator for the value of shipments
for manufacturing industries from 1976 to 2011.11 All nominal values are converted
to 1997 U.S. dollars using this industry-level deflator for the value of shipments for
manufacturing industries, and the BEA’s Consumer Price Index for other industries.




U.S. firms in the LBD and industry-level trade data from 1982 to 2007 for each
regression specification.
2.2.1.1 Measure of the likelihood each patent is used for internal
innovation
In this study, I use the self-citation ratio as a measure of whether a patent
primarily reeflects internal innovation. Each granted patent is required to cite all
prior patents on which it builds. When a cited patent belongs to the owner of the
citing patent, these citations are called self-citations. Akcigit and Kerr (2018) use
the self-citation ratio—defined as the ratio of self-citations to total citations—as
a measure of the likelihood each patent is used for internal innovation. The more
an idea is based on the firm’s internal knowledge stock (self-citation), the more
likely the innovation is used for improving the firm’s existing products (internal
innovation). A higher self-citation ratio means that a patent is more likely to reflect
internal innovation.12
2.2.1.2 Measures of Trade Shocks
As shown by Handley and Limão (2017), over one-third of the growth of im-
ports from China to the U.S. in the first half of the 2000s can be explained by the
U.S. granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China upon China’s
2001 accession to the WTO. Nonmarket economies such as China are subject to rel-
12Thus, 100% self-citation means the patent is used for internal innovation with a 100% probabil-
ity, and 0% self-citation means the patent is used for external innovation with a 100% probability.
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atively high tariff rates, originally set under the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
when they export to the U.S. These rates are known as non-Normal Trade Relations
(non-NTR) or column 2 tariffs. On the other hand, the U.S. offers WTO member
countries NTR or column 1 tariffs, which are substantially lower than non-NTR
tariffs. The Trade Act of 1974 allows the President of the United States to grant
temporary NTR status to nonmarket countries on an annually renewable basis after
approval by Congress. Starting from 1980, U.S. Presidents granted such waivers to
China.
While China never lost these waivers and the tariff rates applied to Chinese
products were kept low, the process of annual approval by Congress created un-
certainty about whether the low tariffs would revert to non-NTR rates. After the
Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Congress voted on a bill to revoke China’s tem-
porary NTR status every year from 1990 to 2001. Following the bilateral agreement
on China’s entry into the WTO between the U.S. and China in 1999, Congress
passed a bill granting China PNTR status in October 2000. Upon China’s accession
to the WTO in December 2001, PNTR became effective and was implemented on
January 1, 2002. PNTR removed the uncertainty about U.S. trade policy toward
China by permanently setting tariff rates on Chinese products at NTR levels. This
lowered the expected U.S. import tariffs on Chinese products, and eliminated any
option value of waiting for firms to incur large fixed costs associated with export-
ing products from China to the U.S. Thus, PNTR reduced trade policy uncertainty
(TPU), the more so for industries with a large gap between tariff rates under NTR
and non-NTR regimes.
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I use the industry-level gap between NTR tariff rates reserved for WTO mem-
bers and non-NTR tariff rates for non-market economies in the year 1999 as a proxy
for the industry-level competitive pressure shock from China occurring in 2001.13
Thus, for industry j,
NTRGapj “ Non NTR Ratej ´ NTR Ratej .
Also, following Aghion et al. (2017), I use log differences in advanced countries’
exports to China (excluding the U.S.) as a proxy for exogenous changes in Chinese
demand for U.S. products (an export shock).14 Thus,
∆ExportShockjτ “ logpEXjτ1q ´ logpEXjτ0q ,
where EXjt represents total exports by eight advanced countries to China in industry
j in year t, τ P t1992´ 1999 , 2000´ 2007u are the two periods of interest, τ0 is the
start-year for each period, and τ1 is the end-year for each period. If a firm operates in
multiple 6-digit NAICS industries, I use the employment-weighed average NTRGapj
and ∆ExportShockjτ . I use unweighted average trade shocks and shocks to firms’
main industry as robustness checks. Table B.1 and Table B.2 in the Appendix report
summary statistics for each trade shock measure.
13We can consider the NTR gap as a first-order Taylor approximation of model-based TPU
measures, such as Handley and Limão (2017), that is positively related to non-NTR rate and
negatively related to NTR rate.
14These advanced countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain, and Switzerland. These are the advanced countries for which we can obtain disaggregated
bilateral HS trade data back to 1991, as explained in Autor et al. (2019)
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2.2.2 Empirical Strategies and Main Results
The theory developed in Chapter 1 provides three empirically testable predic-
tions: i) the escape-competition effect, ii) the technological-barrier effect, and iii)
the expected profit effect. I now test these three model predictions.
2.2.2.1 The Escape-Competition Effect
The first prediction of my model is that firms who have innovated inten-
sively in recent periods increase internal innovation more when they are faced with
higher competition, compared to their low innovation counterparts. This is because
innovation-intensive firms can escape competition more easily through additional in-
ternal innovation, by leveraging their higher-than-average production technologies
(technological advantages, or technological barriers) that they built in their own
markets through recent intensive innovation.
Following Handley and Limão (2017) and Pierce and Schott (2016), I use
a Difference-in-Difference (DD) specification to identify the effect of the China
competitive pressure shock on U.S. firm innovation for two periods, p P t1992 ´
1999 , 2000´ 2007u, for firm i in industry j:
∆yijp “ β1Postp ˆNTRGapijp0 ˆ InnovIntensijp0 (2.1)
` β2Postp ˆNTRGapijp0 ` β3Postp ˆ InnovIntensijp0
` β4NTRGapijp0 ˆ InnovIntensijp0
` β5NTRGapijp0 ` β6InnovIntensijp0
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` Xijp0 γ1 ` Xjp0 γ2 ` δj ` δp ` α ` εijp .
In these specifications, firms in low TPU industries are the control group, whereas
firms in high TPU industries are the treatment group. I use the 2000 cohort of firms
to measure firm innovation before the policy change, which occurred in December
2001. In this way, the composition of firms in terms of their innovation is minimally
affected by the policy change.
Postp is a dummy variable equal to one for the period 2000-2007 and zero
otherwise. It captures changes in firm innovation after China’s WTO accession.
Xijp0 is a vector of firm controls, and Xjp0 is a vector of industry controls, both
measured at the start-year for each period.15 δj is an industry fixed effect (six-digit
NAICS), and δp is a period fixed effect. All models are unweighted, and standard
errors are clustered on the 6-digit NAICS industries.
∆yijp is the DHS (Davis et al., 1996) growth rate of either i) the total citation-
adjusted number of patents, or ii) the citation-weighted average self-citation ratio
between the start-year and end-year for each period p P t1992´1999 , 2000´2007u.
An increase in the self-citation ratio means that the firm’s innovations became more
internal. To maximize the sample size, I include firms that applied for at least one
patent in the start-year and at least one patent in or before the end-year for each
period, and compute the DHS growth rates for the longest span of years available. I
15Firm controls include: firm employment, firm age, past 5-year growth of U.S. patents in the
CPC technology classes in which the firm operates, and dummy variables for publicly traded firms,
exporters, importers, and offshoring firms. Industry control variables include NTR rates measured
at the start of each period.
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Table 2.1: Escape-competition effect
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post ˆ Innov.-inten. 0.077 -0.017 0.732** 0.784***
(0.231) (0.233) (0.299) (0.268)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Controls no full no full
Notes: Full controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log
employment, firm age, NTR rate, dummy for publicly traded firms, dummy for firms with total
imports ą 0, dummy for firms with total exports ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from
relative parties ą 0. Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the
constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’
major industries are displayed below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation
counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05,
*** p ă 0.01.
also require firms to have at least one patent before the start-year of each period, or
to have age ą 0, to avoid the effect coming from firm entry. The sample includes all
LBD firms matched to the USPTO patent database that meet these three criteria,
except for firms in FIRE industries.
InnovIntensijp0 is a continuous variable equal to the past five-year average of
the ratio of the number of firm i’s patent applications to total employment, mea-
sured in the start year for each period p0. I control for industry-fixed effects for
this measure by dividing it by its time-average at the 2-digit NAICS level. Thus,
I am examining the impact of heterogeneity of innovation intensity within indus-
tries rather than differences across industries. The escape-competition hypothesis
predicts β1 to be positive when changes in the self-citation ratio are used as ∆yijp .
Table 2.1 shows the estimates of β1.
16 As indicated in column (4) of Table 2.1,
the estimate for β1 is positive and statistically significant when the growth rate of the
16To conserve space, Table 2.1 reports coefficients estimates for triple interaction terms only.
Results including coefficients for all the interaction terms are reported in Table B.8 in the Appendix.
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self-citation ratio is the dependent variable, consistent with the model predictions.
This estimated value for β1 implies 4.1 percentage points increase in the growth
rate of the average self-citation ratio for a firm with average innovation intensity
(0.18) in an industry with an average NTR gap (0.291). The average value of the
seven-year growth rate of the average self-citation ratio between 2000 and 2007 is
28.2%. Thus, this is about a 14.6% increase.
The estimated effect is economically important as well. Table B.11 in Ap-
pendix B.1.4 shows that for an average firm, creating 4 more patents is associated
with a 3.4 percentage points increase in employment growth, but the association
becomes smaller in magnitude if the average self-citation ratio of the new patents is
high. The estimates in Table 2.1, combined with Table B.11, suggest that the asso-
ciation between patenting and employment growth is decreased by 1.13 percentage
points for firms with average innovation intensity following the competitive pressure
shock from China.
Lastly, Table B.8 in the Appendix shows that Chinese competitive pressure
shock has no statistically significant effect on firms’ overall innovation. My model
predicts that some firms increase their internal innovation while others decrease
theirs, and overall, firms lower their external innovation. When these heterogeneous
responses are combined, we should see a non-significant effect on average. Thus, the
regression results are consistent with the model prediction. And because firms do
not change their overall innovation, the increasing self-citation ratio implies that in-
novative firms (firms with above-average innovation intensity) increase their internal
innovation while decreasing their external innovation.
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2.2.2.1.1 Discussion: PNTR as a Measure of Competitive Pressure
As discussed extensively in Pierce and Schott (2016) and Facchini et al. (2019),
the main channel by which the removal of trade policy uncertainty affects trade
between the U.S. and China is by persuading Chinese firms to export their products
to the U.S. The two papers verify this channel by estimating the effect of the removal
of TPU on changes in Chinese exports to the U.S. using the LFTTD at the product
level, and Chinese Custom Data at the firm level. Table B.9 in the Appendix
shows OLS estimates of the effect of PNTR on changes in U.S. imports from China
from 2000 to 2007 at the 8-digit HS level and the 6-digit NAICS level separately.
As indicated in the table, the NTR gap is positively associated with changes in
U.S. imports from China regardless of the level of aggregation. However, statistical
significance falls from the 1% to the 10% level as we move from the 8-digit HS level
to the 6-digit NAICS level, where the latter is the level of aggregation used in this
paper.
As is clear from the simple three-period model introduced in Section 1.3, one
critical factor firms consider when they decide how much to invest in innovation
is competitive pressure—the probability of encountering competitors in a firm’s
own market in the near future. In the real world, pressure can come from both
realized competition (an increase in the number of competitors) and from anticipated
competition (an increase in the number of potential entrants). Table B.10 shows
OLS results from regressing the two dependent variables of interest on interaction
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involving the realized changes in U.S. imports from China, to estimate the effect of
realized competition on the composition of firm innovation. Here, I simply replace
the NTR gap terms in equation 2.1 with the realized changes in U.S. imports from
China and use the same two seven-year periods used in the previous analysis, 1992-
1999 and 2000-2007. As the table indicates, changes in U.S. imports from China
from 1992 to 2007 do not have any statistically significant effect on U.S. firms’
composition of innovation after I control for firm characteristics.
This analysis, however, has two concerns: i) changes in U.S. imports from
China (a measure for realized competition) are endogenous due to various factors,
and importantly, ii) competitive pressure from anticipated future competition is
(potentially more) important for firms’ innovation decisions, and successful escape
competition by U.S. firms can make realized competition low even if competitive
pressure is substantial. The first concern can be addressed by using the imposition
of PNTR as an instrument for changes in imports. However, as Table B.9 shows, the
NTR gap has low statistical power for predicting changes in U.S. imports from China
at the 6-digit NAICS level. This indicates that the NTR gap is a weak instrument
for realized competition.
My model suggests that the second concern is important, and that measures of
realized competition inherently cannot capture the amount of competition escaped.
The removal of trade policy uncertainty, however, can be an excellent proxy for
increased competitive pressure, as it is associated with an increase in Chinese firms’
opportunity to enter the U.S. market. For example, Handley and Limão (2017),
through the lens of their structural model, show that a reduction in TPU provides
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greater incentive for incumbents to incur irreversible investments to enter foreign
markets. Erten and Leight (2019) further show that the imposition of PNTR induces
Chinese manufacturing firms to increase their investment and their value-added per
worker. These findings suggest a tight relationship between the imposition of PNTR
and an increase in potential future competition. Thus, finding direct evidence for
this relationship, such as a link between PNTR and the number of Chinese startups
or the number of Chinese firms with the ability to export their products to the U.S.,
is a priority for future research.
2.2.2.1.2 Validity of the Identification Strategy and Robustness Tests
Previous studies using PNTR with China as a competitive pressure shock, such
as Pierce and Schott (2016) and Handley and Limão (2017), provide rich evidence
for the exogeneity of PNTR for U.S. firms’ decisions in the 1990s and 2000s. Thus, I
focus on testing the parallel pre-trends assumption, the key identifying assumption
for the DD model. To test the assumption for the dependent variables of interest,
I estimate (2.1) for two seven-year periods before the policy change, 1984-1991 and
1992-1999. Table B.12 in the Appendix shows the results, which support the validity
of the parallel pre-trends assumption.
To further confirm the validity of my results, I perform several robustness
checks, with results reported in the Appendix. I find that my results are robust to
a variety of different specifications. First, I include upstream and downstream com-
petitive pressure shocks as covariates in model (2.1). By using the 1992 BEA input-
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output table, I construct upstream and downstream competitive pressure shocks as
weighted averages of industry-level trade shocks. The upstream effect of trade is
the effect of trade shocks propagating upstream from an industry’s buyers, and the
downstream effect of trade is the effect of trade shocks propagating downstream
from its suppliers.17 Table B.13 in the Appendix shows that including controls for
I-O linkages does not change the main results.
The second test uses different weights for constructing firm-level NTR gaps.
Because patenting firms are typically multi-industry firms, in my baseline regres-
sions I use employment in the start year of each period as weights and construct a
weighted average of industry-level NTR gaps for all industries in which each firm
operates as the firm-level NTR gap. As a robustness check, I also use an unweighted
average of this measure, and industry-level NTR gaps for firms’ main industry (the
industry with the most employment) as alternative measures for TPU in model (2.1).
Table B.15 in the Appendix shows that using these alternative measures does not
change the main results.
The third test addresses possible selection bias resulting from including only
firms with a positive number of patents granted in the start year and in any of the
last four years of each period in the regression analysis. This selection is inevitable
as I need to compute the self-citation ratio for two years for each period. I correct for
this bias by re-weighting the regression sample using the inverse of the propensity
17Following Pierce and Schott (2016), for each 6-digit NAICS industry, I set the I-O weights to
zero for both up and downstream industries belonging to the same 3-digit NAICS broad industries
while computing the indirect effects to take into account the findings from Bernard et al. (2010)
that U.S. manufacturing establishments often produce clusters of products within the same 3-digit
NAICS sector.
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scores from a logit model with an indicator for being in the analysis sample as
the dependent variable as weights. Table B.16 in the Appendix shows that this
reweighting does not change the results. The fourth test adds the cumulative number
of patents as a firm-level control variable in the model (2.1). The self-citation
ratio can mechanically increase because the firm’s patent stock increases as the firm
becomes older. Adding the cumulative number of patents as a firm-level covariate
addresses this issue, and Table B.17 in the Appendix shows that this does not change
the results.
The fifth test clusters standard errors on firms. The second test indicates that
most variation in the firm-level NTR gap occurs at the industry-level. Thus, I cluster
standard errors at the six-digit NAICS level in the main analysis. As a robustness
check, I cluster standard errors on firms, and Table B.18 in the Appendix shows
this does not change our inference on the main results. Finally, I test the robustness
of my results by using the number of products added—an alternative measure for
external innovation (the inverse of internal innovation)—as the dependent variable.
Table B.19 in the Appendix shows results that support the model prediction, that
higher competitive pressure reduces number of new products added for innovative
firms.
2.2.2.2 The Technological-Barrier Effect
Another prediction from my model is that firms do less external innovation if
other firms have performed more innovation in the past period. Intensive innovation
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by other firms raises the technology barrier in other markets on average, which
implies that business take over through external innovation becomes more difficult.
Thus, firms optimally reduce their R&D spending on external innovation. To test
this theoretical prediction, I use the recent increase in the number of foreign patent
applications as a proxy for increasing innovation intensity in other markets. Since
I don’t have product-market information for foreign firms, I use patent technology
class (CPC) as a proxy for product in this exercise. Foreign patents are defined as
patents filed by foreign firms whose first listed inventor is a foreigner. I use the pre-
shock years from the period 1989 to 2000 and construct non-overlapping five-year






ijt´5 `Xijt γ1 ` δjt`5 ` εijt`5
∆Yijt`5 is either the 5-year DHS growth rate of the citation-adjusted number of
patents or the average self-citation ratio between t and t` 5, and ∆S
tech
ijt´5 for tech P
tOwn, Outsideu is the lagged average 5-year DHS growth rate of foreign patents
inside firm i’s own technology space (Own) and outside firm i’s technology space
(Outside).
To be more specific, for each technology class c in CPC, denote the total
number of foreign patents filed in year t as Sc,t. Then the DHS growth rate of
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foreign patents belonging to c between year t´ 5 and t can be written as
∆Sc,t´5 ”
Sc,t ´ Sc,t´5
0.5ˆ pSc,t ` Sc,t´5q
.
Denote Qt as the set of all the patent technology classes available until year t, and
Qijt as the portfolio of patent technology classes firm i accumulated through year
t. This defines the technology space in which firm i operates. Furthermore, denote
ωc,i,j,t as the share of patent technology class c in firm i’s technology portfolio through
year t. Then the lagged growth in innovation intensity in firm i’s own technology
space, ∆S
Own







while the counterpart firm i’s outside of own space, ∆S
Outside









where Qcijt ” QtzQijt is the complement of the set Qijt, and }Q
c
ijt} is the number of
technology classes in Qcijt. Table B.3 in the Appendix reports summary statistics for
the technology shock measures. The regression is unweighted and standard errors are
clustered by firm. I include industry-period fixed effects to control for industry-level
shocks. The theory predicts β2 to be positive when the change in the self-citation
ratio is the dependent variable, and insignificant or negative for changes in the total
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Table 2.2: Technological-barrier effect
∆Patents ∆Self-cite
(1) (2)
Past 5 year ∆foreign patent, outside of firm’s own tech. fields -5.984** 9.076***
(2.756) (2.711)
Observation 7,600 7,600
Fixed effects jp jp
Notes: Controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log payroll,
firm age, dummy for publicly traded firms, dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy for
firms with total exports ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from relative parties ą 0. Esti-
mates for industry-period (jp) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed.Robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level are displayed below each coefficient. Observations
are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance pro-
cedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
number of patents.
Table 2.2 shows estimates of β2.
18 As the table indicates, U.S. firms create
fewer patent applications when recent outside innovation by foreign firms is high,
and firms’ innovation is more internal in nature. This suggests that U.S. firms
perform less external innovation when the technological barrier is high in product
markets outside of their own.
2.2.2.3 The Ex-post Schumpeterian Effect
The final prediction of my model that I test is that firms do more internal
innovation if they expect to get higher profits from their current product markets
in the near future. To test this prediction, I use the export shock described in
Section 2.2.1.2 as a proxy for changes in future profits. Thus, for firm i in industry
18Table B.20 in the Appendix shows the estimation results for own technology field shock, as
well as the results including the interaction with firms’ innovation intensities. I also run the same
regression specification using concurrent technology shock, and Table B.21 in the Appendix shows
the results. The results are widely consistent with that of the lagged technology shock.
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Table 2.3: Effect of export shocks on firm innovation composition
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export shock 0.046 0.047 -0.013 -0.014
(0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.035)
X Innovation intensity 0.003 0.014*
(0.008) (0.008)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Notes: Controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log employ-
ment, firm age, dummy for publicly traded firms, dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy
for firms with total exports ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from relative parties ą 0.
Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major industries are dis-
played below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due
to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
j in period p P t1992´1999, 2000´2007u, I estimate the following regression model:
∆yijp “ β2∆ExportShockjp ` Xijp0 γ1 ` δj ` δp ` α ` εijp , (2.2)
where the descriptions for each variable are the same as described in model (2.1).
Table 2.3 reports the results. As the table indicates, there is no statistically
significant effect of the export shock on the average firm’s level or compotition of
innovation. These weak results might be because few U.S. firms were exporting to
China even in 2007, and the share of the total value of shipments accounted for
by the value of exports to China is quite small, as shown in Table B.5 and B.6 of
the Appendix. The interaction term with firm-level innovation intensity, however,
is statistically significant and positive when the change in the self-citation ratio is
the dependent variable. Thus, firms with above-average recent innovation intensity
increase their internal innovation when they are faced with increased opportunities
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for exporting their products. We will see in the quantitative analysis in Section 2.4.4
that this result is consistent with the prediction from the baseline two-country model.
2.3 Baseline Two-Country Model
In this section, I extend the baseline model developed in Chapter 1 into a two-
country framework. Time is discrete. Two countries, home (H) and foreign (F ),
are endowed with LH and LF units of labor, which are potentially different. In each
country, there is a single final good producer operating in a perfectly competitive
market, and a continuum of differentiated good producers operating in monopolisti-
cally competitive markets. The mass of differentiated good producers is determined
through endogenous entry and exit. In each period, there is a fixed mass of potential
startups in the differentiated good sector in each country, and those which success-
fully take over existing good markets through external innovation enter the economy.
Differentiated goods are tradable but subject to variable trade costs, and produc-
ers from the two countries compete for technological leadership in a continuum of
measure one goods markets through internal and external innovation. External in-
novation requires learning another firm’s technology, but learning takes time. Thus,
there is an imperfect technology spillover in the form of lagged learning, as firms
can only learn other firms’ past-period technologies. Below I describe the economy
mainly for the home country H, and super/subscript H is omitted whenever there
is no confusion. Time subscript t is also omitted whenever there is no confusion.19
19I use the term technology and product quality interchangeably.
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2.3.1 Representative Household
The representative household has a logarithmic utility function and is popu-
lated by a continuum of individuals with total measure L. Each individual supplies
one unit of labor each period inelastically and consumes a portion Ct of a unique final
good (consumption bundle) in the economy produced by the final good producer.





βt logpCtq . (2.3)
Homogeneous workers are employed in the final goods (L) and differentiated goods
(rL) sectors. Thus, in each period, the labor market satisfies
L` rL “ L . (2.4)
The household maximizes its lifetime utility (2.3) subject to the period-by-period
budget constraint
Ct ď wtL` Πt ` rΠt `Gt , (2.5)
where wt is the wage, Πt is the final good producer’s profits, rΠt is differentiated
good producers’ total profits net of R&D expenses, and Gt is government transfers
including tariff revenues.
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2.3.2 Final Good Producer
Both countries produce an identical final good. The final good is used for con-
sumption and R&D expenditure for differentiated goods. The final good producer
uses labor (LH) and a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by j P r0, 1s to
produce a final good, where some of the differentiated goods can be produced by
foreign exporters. Denote JcH as an index set for differentiated goods sold in the
home country that are produced by firms in country c P tH,F u, and ycHj as the
quantity of good j sold from c to H. Then a constant returns to scale production




























where qHj is the quality of good j in countryH, possibly different from that in country
F , and It¨u are indicator functions. The final good is produced competitively, and
input prices—wH for labor and p
H
j for good j sold in H—as well as product quality
qcj are taken as given. When there are multiple potential suppliers for the same
good from the home and/or foreign countries, the final good producer chooses the
supplier with the combination of product quality and marginal cost of production
(adjusted by trade costs for imported goods) that gives the final good supplier the
highest profits.
To simplify the model and allow trade imbalances in the differentiated goods
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sector, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 2. The final good is traded without friction and absorbs possible im-
balances in differentiated goods trade.
Free trade in the final good sector, along with identical final good production func-
tions in both countries, imply that the final good price in both countries, PH and
PF , will be the same. I normalize that price to one in each period for both countries
without loss of generality.
2.3.3 Differentiated Goods Producers
There is a set of measure FH of home firms and a set of measure FFH of foreign
exporters with FH`FFH P p0, 1q, which are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
These firms produce differentiated goods each period and sell their products in the
home market. Some of the home firms (FHF ď FH) export a portion of their
products as well, which is also determined endogenously based on their product
quality and marginal cost of production. Each good is produced in the producer’s
own country using local labor. Each operating firm owns at least one product line,
and a single firm owns each product line in each country. Thus, a firm f can be
characterized as its collection of product lines J f “ tj : j is owned by firm fu,
where nf ”‖ J f ‖ is the number of products firm f produces.
Because international trade is costly and the marginal cost of production can
be different across countries, some domestic firms may have zero demand from the
foreign final good producer, and foreign demand is absorbed by foreign differentiated
96
good firms. In such cases, the quality of product j in the home country (qHj ), along
with the ownership of the good j, can be different from that in a foreign country





. If a firm in country
H exports good j, then ∆Gj,t is not defined as there is no firm in country F producing
good j. In this case, I simply define ∆Gj,t “ 8. In the case where a country F firm
exports good j, I define ∆Gj,t “ ´8.
Also, because there are imperfect technology spillovers, the current period
frontier technology can be different from the last period technology that another firm
can learn. The local technology gap for each market j in each country c P tH,F u is
defined as ∆cj,t ”
qcj,t
qcj,t´1
. Thus, each product line can be characterized by its quality












Denote yHHj as the quantity of good j produced by a home firm and supplied
to home market j. Each good j P r0, 1s is produced using domestic labor `HHj with
a linear technology;









qFj dj is the average product quality (average production
technology) of differentiated goods traded in home markets. If good j is exported
by a home firm to foreign market j, then it is produced using the same technology;




but it is subject to an iceberg cost dHF ą 1 and an ad-valorem tariff rτHF ě 1. Thus,
in order to sell yHFj units of good j in the foreign market, the home firm needs to
ship τHF ˆ y
HF
j units, where τHF ” rτHF ˆ dHF .
2.3.4 Innovation by Differentiated Good Producers
The differentiated good producers engage in two types of R&D—internal and
external—to increase their profits from the products they currently produce, to pro-
tect their product markets from competitors, and to expand their businesses, where
the R&D output takes the form of improvements in product quality (equivalently,
production technology). Innovation outcomes are realized at the beginning of the
next period. To allow incumbent firms to protect their own product markets from
competitors (the escape-competition effect) and to make it more difficult to take over
other firms’ product markets when overall innovation intensity in the economy is
high (the technological-barrier effect), I introduce imperfect technological spillovers,
which are captured by lagged learning: firms that don’t own product line j can
only learn the incumbent’s last period technology, qj,t´1. Thus, external innovation
builds on the past-period technology used in the domestic market. A home firm can
learn a foreign firm’s technology if and only if that foreign firm sells its products in
the home country.
In this setup, learning another firm’s technology is costly in the sense that
i) outside firms can only learn last period’s technology, and ii) learning involves
R&D—only firms with strictly positive R&D expenditure can learn another firm’s
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past technology through undirected learning.20 Product line-specific current period
technology qj,t, and thus the local technology gap ∆j,t ”
qj,t
qj,t´1
, are observable only
to the firms operating in product line j in that period. However, aggregate variables
and the distribution of local technology gap (the share of product lines with a certain
level of local technology gap) are publicly observable. Thus, a stationary equilibrium
can be well defined. When two firms’ technologies are neck and neck in one product
line, a coin-toss tiebreaker rule applies as in Acemoglu et al. (2016) to make sure
each product is produced by only one firm. An unused technology (idea) is assumed
to depreciate by an amount sufficient to ensure that it becomes unprofitable to
innovate on top of it next period.21
With the last two assumptions, only the winning firm from the coin toss keeps
the product line until it is taken over by another firm through creative destruction
(external innovation), while the losing firm never tries to enter the same market
through internal innovation in the neck and neck case. Thus, the undirected nature
of external innovation is ensured, and only a firm producing a product in a current
period is allowed to do internal innovation on that product. Finally, to maintain
tractability I assume that each firm can do only one external innovation in each
period regardless of the total number of product lines the firm owns.
20Firms do not know which product line technology they will learn prior to their learning. This
assumption helps the model tractable.
21If you don’t recall your skill or idea frequently, you gradually forget about it. This is in some
sense consistent with the literature discussing displaced workers’ human capital depreciation.
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2.3.4.1 Internal Innovation
Successful internal innovation improves the current quality qj,t for differenti-
ated good j by λ ą 1. The probability of internal innovation, zj,t, is determined by









where pχ ą 0 and pψ ą 1. Thus incumbent firm’s good j quality realized at the























with probability 1´ zj,t .
As time is discrete and firms are multi-product firms, internal innovation outcomes
follow a binomial process as in Ates and Saffie (2016).
2.3.4.2 External Innovation
Incumbents and potential startups attempt to take over other incumbents’
markets through external innovation. Successful external innovation generates an
improvement in product quality by a factor of η ą 1 relative to the incumbent’s
lagged technology, where R&D results are realized at the beginning of next period.
22Hereafter, I write the quality of good j as a point set. This makes it easy to write the case
when external innovation fails and firm does not acquire any product lines, which will be written
as product quality set to be an empty set.
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I assume λ2 ą η ą λ. This assumption ensures that firms can protect their own
product lines from outside firms through internal innovation, while η ą λ reflects
the idea that external innovation introduces a new way of producing an existing
product more efficiently. Thus, external innovation contributes more to both firm
employment and aggregate growth than internal innovation, as found empirically in
Akcigit and Kerr (2018). Both potential startups’ and incumbent firms’ external
innovations are undirected in the sense that they are realized in any other product
line with equal probability.
Existing firms with at least one product line (nf ą 0) decide the probability
of external innovation xt by choosing R&D expenditures R
ex










where rχ ą 0, rψ ą 1, and q̄t is the average quality in the country where the firm is
located. Thus, for prospective external innovators whose takeover is not pre-empted
by the incumbent’s successful defensive innovation, the distribution of quality at the




















∅ with probability 1´ xt .
With probability 1 ´ xt, the external innovation fails, which implies there is zero
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probability that the firm will take over product line j. In this case, product quality
for product line j for the potential entrant does not exist.
As a rival firm can only learn last period’s technology, the local technology gap
is an important factor determining an incumbent firm’s success/failure at protecting
its product line through internal innovation. With the above setup for innovation
there are four possible technology gaps in this model economy, ∆1 “ 1, ∆2 “ λ,
∆3 “ η, and ∆4 “ η
λ
. Detail is provided in Lemma 1 in Chapter 1.
2.3.4.3 Entry and Exit in the Differentiated Good Sector
At the beginning of each period, there is an exogenously determined EH mass of
new potential domestic startups trying to start businesses in the differentiated good
sector. To start a business, a potential startup needs to invest in external R&D and
take over one of the product lines from an incumbent firm. The potential startups,
who have no existing product lines, decide the probability of external innovation xe,t









where rχe ą 0, and rψe ą 1. For potential startups whose takeover attempt is not






















∅ with probability 1´ xe,t .
Incumbent firms in the differentiated good sector are engaged in internal and
external innovation in each period. Thus, not only do they expand by developing
improved versions of their existing products, they also expand by adding new prod-
uct lines to their portfolio. However, as there are other firms engaged in external
innovation as well, an individual incumbent firm is always faced with a positive
probability of losing some of its own product markets to competitors. As there is
a continuum of measure one product lines and a continuum of differentiated good
producers, each product line faces the same probability of encountering a competi-
tor. This probability is called the aggregate endogenous creative destruction arrival
rate and it is equal to the average probability of external innovation in the economy:
x “ FHxH ` EHxHe
looooooomooooooon
”xH




where Fc is the mass of incumbents, Ec is the mass of potential startups , xc is
the probability of external innovation by incumbents, and xce is the probability of
external innovation by potential startups in country c. Here, I write the probability
of external innovation for each group of firms as equal across all the firms in the same
group. I verify this holds in equilibrium in the later section. Thus, xc is the portion
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of the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate due to external innovation by firms
in country c. An incumbent firm losing all of its product lines to competitors exits
the economy, and it receives the value equal to the sum of discounted expected
profits from a successful external innovation when it exits. This compensation for
its accumulated knowledge stock ensures that incumbents with no product lines
optimally do not to attempt to perform external innovation to re-enter the economy.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
2.3.5.1 Production
The standard profit maximization problem of the final good producer in coun-
try c P tH,F u gives us their inverse demand curve for differentiated good j produced

















where pcj is the price for differentiated good j sold in country c, and Pc is the final
good price in country c, which is equal to one. In deriving demand for good j I
assume that each good is supplied by a single firm in a particular country. However,
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past incumbent firms in domestic markets that lost technological leadership to the
current leader could in principle try to produce and sell their products through limit
pricing, as the marginal cost of production is equal across all domestic firms. To
avoid such cases and to simplify the model, I adopt the following two-stage price-
bidding game assumption.
Assumption 3. In a given product line j in a given country, the current incumbents
and any former incumbents in the same line enter a two-stage price-bidding game.
In the first stage, each firm pays a fee of ε ą 0. In the second stage, all firms that
paid the fee announce their prices.
This assumption ensures that only the technological leader (adjusted for marginal
costs and trade frictions) in a given country enters the first stage and announces
its price in equilibrium. By using (2.9), the profit maximization problem of the

























































where τcc “ 1. The first order conditions of the above problem (and its foreign firm
105






























which is an unconstrained monopoly price given that the seller is the technological
leader (taking into account trade frictions and the marginal costs) in each country
c. The optimal price is independent of the individual product quality. Optimal
quantities supplied by firms in country c are equal to
yccj pq
c



























Then, profits for a firm in country c with technology qcj selling to market j in its
own country are equal to














and profits for the same firm from selling to market j in country rc are equal to


















Importantly, both expressions are linear in qcj . Notice that product quality of good
j sold in country rc by a firm in country c is denoted as qcj . This is because product
quality is firm-specific, in that if a firm produces good j in its own country c with
quality qcj , then the quality of good j the firm can sell in country rc is also equal to
qcj .
Denote total product quality of goods produced by firms in country rc P tH,F u






































Total labor hired by differentiated good producers in country c is equal to
























and total labor hired by the final good producer is equal to Lc “ Lc ´ rLc. The last
three equations for the two countries can be solved for wc, rLc, and Lc as functions
of aggregate qualities, price indices, and trade costs.
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Other equations are described in Technical Appendix B.3.5.
2.3.5.2 International Trade of Differentiated goods
Denote MCH ” wH
qH
as the marginal cost of production for domestic differen-
tiated good firms, and MCF ” wF
qF
as the foreign counterpart. Recall that τFH is
the trade cost to foreign firms exporting to domestic markets, and τHF is the trade
cost to domestic firms exporting to the foreign country. Proposition 6 shows how
these values define ranges for the global technology gap ∆G corresponding to the
direction of trade between home and foreign countries, which come from a profit
maximizing final good producer that values product quality.
Proposition 6. Denote threshold ratios of marginal cost for home firms to foreign






























Then, the home firm exports good j to the foreign country iff
∆Gj ą Ω ,
while the home final good firm imports j from the foreign country iff
∆Gj ă Ω .





Proof: See Technical Appendix B.3.3.1.
Proposition 6 shows that depending on the relative size of (trade cost-adjusted)
marginal costs, which are equivalent to quality-adjusted wages, foreign products with
low quality (technology) can be sold in domestic markets. The global technology
gap can also be defined by using 2-tuple integers. Denote m as the number of
internal innovations, and n as the number of external innovations, in which home
firms advance compared to foreign firms. Assuming that initial quality of good j
in both countries is the same, ∆Gj “
qHj
qFj
“ λm ˆ ηn and this can be written as
Ă∆Gj “ pm,nq.
As briefly explained earlier, there is free trade in the final good sector, in which
















































where Xc is the net quantity of final goods exported by country c. Xc ą 0 means
country c exports final goods to country rc, and Xc ă 0 means country c imports
final goods from country rc. The first term in the RHS is the total value of differ-
entiated goods imported from country rc, and the second term is the total value of
differentiated goods exported to rc.
2.3.5.3 Firm Values and Optimal Innovation Decision






































































qcj if firm is an exporter
are profits from production net of labor costs and tariffs, as defined in the previous
section, and where the second and third terms in parentheses are R&D expenses for
internal and external innovation. Since all firms are owned by the household, they
















jPJ f , x
c
¯ ı
is defined in Appendix B.2.1.1.
Proposition 7. For a given joint distribution over local technology gaps for home
and foreign markets and global technology gaps, the value function of a firm in coun-






































dependent of product quality qcj . The value from external innovation is equal to B
cqc,
which is also equal to the exit value of an incumbent firm, V cp∅q “ Bcqc. Further-









. Finally, optimal external innovation intensity xc is indepen-
dent of firm characteristics and equal across all incumbent firms.
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Proof: See Technical Appendix B.3.4.2.
















, Bc, and xc












denote the value of a firm in country c that has
only one product line j, with product quality qcj , local technology gaps in home
and foreign markets ∆Hj and ∆
F
j , and global technology gap ∆
G
j . Then a potential



















An analytic expression for optimal external innovation for potential startups
is derived in Technical Appendix B.3.4.3.
2.3.5.5 Evolution of the Technology-Gap Distribution and Aggregate
Growth









and its quality qj. Thus, the index for each
product, j, is redundant. Furthermore, what matters for firms’ optimal decisions
are the technology gaps, and firms need to know the distribution of technology
gaps across markets—local technology gaps in home and foreign markets, ∆H and
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∆F , and global technology gaps, ∆G. Denote the technology gap distribution as
µ
`
∆H , ∆F , ∆G
˘
. Appendix B.3.1 shows how technology gaps evolve over time
according to firms’ innovation decisions for each possible set of local and global tech-
nology gaps,
`
∆H , ∆F , ∆G
˘
. In a stationary equilibrium, inflows should be equal
to outflows for each technology gap state µ
`
∆H , ∆F , ∆G
˘
, where inflows and
outflows for each technology gap state are described in Technical Appendix B.3.1.4.
2.3.6 Aggregate Quality Evolution
Proposition 8. Define ∆ ”
`




∆H1, ∆F 1, ∆G1
˘
. Then for
c , rc P tH,F u with c ‰ rc, and for pc P tc,rcu, aggregate quality along a balanced growth














































is an index function equal to one if ∆G falls into the
range for which a firm from country qc produces and sells its product in country c for





is the next period counterpart.
Proof: See Appendix B.2.1.2.1
A complete description of P p∆1|∆q is provided in Technical Appendix B.3.1. and a
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complete description for the evolution ofQcrc is provided in Technical Appendix B.3.3.
Equation (2.16) shows that aggregate output growth is determined by the
growth rate of average quality qc. The following lemma characterizes the aggregate
growth rate.







∆c 1 P p∆1|∆q µp∆q ´ 1 . (2.20)
Proof: This follows from the proof of Proposition 8.
2.3.6.1 Aggregate Variables and Balanced Growth Path (BGP) Equi-
librium
Total R&D expenses in country c, Rc, are
Rc “
ÿ














rψ Fc qc ` rχe pxceq
rψe Ec qc , (2.21)
where the first term is the sum of all internal R&D expenses by incumbent firms, the
second term is the sum of all external R&D expenses by incumbent firms, and the
last term is the sum of all external R&D expenses by potential startups. Note that
zHj
`
∆H , ∆F , ´8
˘
“ 0 and zFj
`
∆H , ∆F , 8
˘








Total profits by incumbent firms net of R&D expenses are then
rΠc “ π
cc Qcc ` πcrc Qcrc ´ PcRc . (2.22)
Since the final good producer is perfectly competitive, its profit is zero, Πc “ 0.
The government transfer, Gc, for c ‰ rc is equal to total tariff revenue:
















Finally, consumption is determined by the resource constraint
PcCc “ PcYc ´ PcXc ´Rc `Gc , (2.23)
which is equal to the households’ total income defined by the households’ budget
constraint (2.5) with equality. I now close this section by defining the equilibrium.
Definition 2 (Balanced Growth Path Equilibrium). Let the world economy consist
of two countries c P tH,F u. A balanced growth path equilibrium of this economy















, xc˚e , x
c˚, x˚, F˚c , R˚c , X˚c , Y ˚c , C˚c , g˚c , Qcrc, Ω, Ω, tµ˚ p∆qu∆
)
such that (i) ycrc˚j and p
c˚




c , and rL
˚
c satisfy (2.14),
(2.15), and Lc “ Lc ´ rLc; (iii) x






to (B.75)-(B.80) and (B.69)-(B.74) according to the value of ∆; (v) xc˚e is equal to
(B.81); (vi) xc˚ is as defined in (2.8); (vii) x˚ is equal to (2.8); (viii) F˚c is consistent
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with optimal innovation decisions; (ix) R˚c satisfies (2.21); (x) X
˚
c satisfies (2.18);
(xi) Y ˚c satisfies (2.16); (xii) C
˚
c satisfies (2.23); (xiii) g
˚
c is given by (2.20); (xiv)
Qcrc evolves according to the evolution of the technology gaps (2.19); (xv) Ω and Ω
satisfy (2.17); and (xvi) tµ˚ p∆qu∆ evolves according to the laws of motion (B.20)-
(B.43) according to the value of ∆.
2.4 Quantitative Analysis
2.4.1 Calibration
There are nineteen structural parameters (assuming symmetry across the two
countries for innovation and production) that I need to calibrate, seven of which I
calibrate internally. Table 2.4 shows the list of parameters and their values used for
the counterfactual exercise. I map my two-country model to the U.S. and China.
As all the products in my model economy are tradable, I calibrate the model to the
U.S. manufacturing sector in 2000.
One complication with this setup is that tariff rates imposed by the U.S.
government on Chinese products in 2000 were virtually unchanged after China’s
WTO accession. However, because there was a possibility of tariff rate increases,
the effective tariff rates Chinese firms perceived before 2001 were higher than the
actual values. To capture this and to run a counterfactual exercise to analyze the
effect of trade liberalization on the composition of firm innovation that mimics what
happened after China’s WTO accession in the U.S., I estimate the effective tariff
rate facing Chinese firms in 2000. Specifically, I assume a 13% probability of the
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Table 2.4: Structural Parameters
Parameter Description Value Identification
1. β Time discount factor 0.9615 Annual interest rate of 4%
2. rτHF Tariff rates for exports from H to F 1.0816 External calibration





Initial global technology gap distribution Matrix External calibration
5. pψ Curvature of internal R&D 2 (Akcigit and Kerr, 2018)
6. rψ Curvature of external R&D 2 (Akcigit and Kerr, 2018)
7. rψe Curvature of external R&D, startup 2 (Akcigit and Kerr, 2018)
8. θ Quality share in final good production 0.109 (Akcigit and Kerr, 2018)
9. LH Mass of labor in country H 1 External calibration
10. LF Mass of labor in country F 1 External calibration
11. EH Mass of potential startups in H 0.5 External calibration
12. EF Mass of potential startups in F 0.5 External calibration
13. λ Quality multiplier of internal innovation 1.044 Indirect inference
14. η Quality multiplier of external innovation 1.067 Indirect inference
15. pχ Scale of internal R&D 0.119 Indirect inference
16. rχ Scale of external R&D 0.714 Indirect inference
17. rχe Scale of external R&D, startup 11.696 Indirect inference
18. dHF Iceberg trade cost for exports from H to F 1.01 Indirect inference
19. dFH Iceberg trade cost for exports from F to H 1.01 Indirect inference
tariff rate increasing to the non-NTR rate, as estimated by Handley and Limão
(2017), an average non-NTR rate of 36%, and an average NTR rate of 4%, to get
an effective tariff rate of 8.16%.
As one period in my model is one year, I set the time discount factor to 0.9615,
implying a real interest rate of 4%. I set the mass of labor to 1 and the mass of po-
tential startups to 0.5 in both countries, as the counterfactual exercise will compare
the two balanced growth path equilibria before and after China’s WTO accession,
and this requires the two countries to be symmetric. I set the initial global technol-
ogy gap distribution to be a symmetric random matrix. This is innocuous as the
effect from the initial values of this matrix will be washed away during the simula-
tion. I set the curvature of the R&D cost functions to 2, which is a standard value
in the firm innovation literature. I set the quality share in final good production to
0.109, the value estimated by Akcigit and Kerr (2018).
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Table 2.5: Model Fit
Moment Data Model Source
1. p90 emp. growth, emp. weighted (%) 19.86 18.46 Decker et al. (2016)
2. Startup rates (%) 6.68 5.64 BDS
3. Agg. domestic sales growth (%) 2.14 1.70 NBER-CES
4. Avg. # of products firms produce 2.27 1.88 CMF
5. Success prob. of adding a product (%) 29.20 22.68 CMF
6. Share of US firms exporting to CN (%) 2.30 1.12 LFTTD
2.4.2 Indirect Inference
There are seven remaining parameters to be estimated: λ, η, pχ, rχ, rχe, dHF ,
and dFH . However, as the two countries are symmetric, dHF “ dFH . Thus, I have six
remaining parameters and these are estimated using an indirect inference approach:
for each set of six parameter values, I compute six model-generated moments, com-






| model momentsi ´ data momentsi |
1
2
| model momentsi | `
1
2
| data momentsi |
where the six moments are listed in Table 2.5.
The six moments are chosen in consideration of both their importance in an-
swering the central question of this paper, and the relationships among the moments
and the parameters coming from the choice of functional forms in the model. Al-
though all the parameter values contribute substantially in determining the value for
each model-generated moment, the tight relationship between specific sub-groups of
parameters and moments can be noted.
Firms perform internal and external R&D to adjust the number of product
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lines they operate. Since R&D cost is one of the crucial factors determining the level
of R&D intensity, and hence the number of product lines the firm owns, I discipline
the scale parameters of internal R&D (pχ) and external R&D (rχ) using the average
number of products owned by firms. How quickly firms add new products to their
portfolio depends on the level of external R&D investment. Thus, I discipline the
scale of external R&D (rχ) using the success probability of adding a product (average
number of products added by firms). Potential startups learn and improve existing
technologies to enter the market, and the success probability of entry is tightly
related to their level of R&D expenditure. Thus I discipline the scale of external
R&D for startups (rχe) using the startup rate.
Firms grow in terms of both sales and the number of employees by improving
the qualities of their existing products and/or adding new product lines to their
product portfolios. How quickly they grow depends on how much product quality
improvement they can achieve. Thus I discipline the quality multipliers of internal
innovation (λ) and external innovation (η) using the average sales growth rate and
employment growth rate at the 90th percentile of the employment-weighted firm
employment growth distribution.
Finally, I discipline the iceberg trade costs dcc1 using the share of U.S. firms




Since I don’t have an analytic expression for the firm distribution, I pin down
values for the masses of firms, FH and FF , through simulation during the numerical
solution algorithm. I simulate 200,000 products over 600 years, then take an average
across outcomes from the last 200 years to capture the model-implied moments. I
solve the model as a fixed point over a vector of growth rates pgH , gF q. Below I
describe the solution algorithm in detail.
Solution Algorithm




, BGP growth rates gc, total
external innovation rates xc, and total quality ratios Qcc
qc











for c P tH,F u,
(a) Compute wc
qc
, Lc, and rLc.
(b) Compute πcrc for c,rc P tH,F u.














, xc and xce for c P tH,F u .
(b) Compute Fc “ x
c´xceEc
xc
. If Fc R p0, 1q, adjust xc and redo 3a.
4. Simulate to get updates for gc, Qcc
qc
, and Fc for c P tH,F u:
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Figure 2.1: Internal Innovation Decision Rule






(b) Assign N cf number of firms implied by Fc computed in 3b to the sample
product lines randomly.




, Fc “ total nb of firmsctotal nb of productsc , and x
c “ xcFc ` xceEc.




by using the law of motion
and innovation rates (use zc and xce from 3a, and x
c from 4d).
6. Compare the initial growth rates in 1 with the values from 4. If the values are
sufficiently different, update 1 with 5 and 4d, and redo the process 2 through
4. Iterate until the two growth rates converge.
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2.4.4 Characteristics of Optimal Innovation Decision Rules
The blue lines in Figure 2.1 show two cross-sections from the internal innova-
tion decision rule for the baseline parameter values, which is four-dimensional. The
left panel shows the average internal innovation decision rule as a function of the
local-technology-gap in the home county (∆H). As we can see, innovation intensity
(the success probability of innovation) increases with ∆H at first, then drops when
∆H “ η. In the latter case, incumbents have such a high technological advantage
that competitors are unlikely to take over their businesses even when incumbents fail
at internal innovation. The right panel shows the internal innovation decision rule
as a function of the global-technology-gap (∆G), which is similar to Akcigit et al.
(2018). Internal innovation intensity peaks near two thresholds. Firms have higher
incentives to do internal innovation near the export-threshold (right), as additional
internal innovation makes firms exporters, which leads to higher profits. Firms also
have higher incentives to do internal innovation near the import-threshold (left), as
the failure of internal innovation leads to losing the product market to foreign firms.
2.4.5 Counterfactual Exercise
I run a counterfactual exercise using a 4.16 percentage point drop in the bi-
lateral tariff rate (from 8.16% to 4%) as a trade shock, which is equivalent to the
average drop in the effective tariff rates faced by Chinese firms after 2001, and
compare the two BGP equilibria. Figure 2.1 shows changes in the optimal internal
innovation decision rule, and Table 2.6 shows changes in firm and aggregate-level
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Table 2.6: Reduction in bilateral tariff rates from 8.16% to 4%
Description Before After % change
Avg. internal innov. intensity zH (%) 19.28 20.99 8.83
Firm level external innov. intensity xH (%) 26.63 24.81 -6.84
Success prob. of adding a product (%) 22.68 20.63 -9.04
Technological barrier (%) 14.82 16.83 13.56
p90 emp. growth (%) 18.46 15.15 -17.94
p10 emp. growth (%) -41.77 -37.89 -9.28
Startup rate (%) 5.64 5.06 -10.26
Aggregate domestic sales growth (%) 1.70 1.69 -0.55
R&D to sales ratio (%) 4.54 4.16 -8.51
Internal R&D expense share 21.84 31.96 46.35
Share of firms exporting (%) 1.12 3.44 206.45
Share of export sales in total sales (%) 0.46 1.64 256.37
moments. Increasing international competition leads firms to shift their innova-
tion from external to internal, which leads to lower employment growth rates for
high-growth firms (firms at the 90th percentile of the firm employment growth dis-
tribution). Employment growth of low-growth firms (firms at the 10th percentile of
the firm employment growth distribution), however, increases, and this leads to a
decline in the skewness of the firm employment growth distribution measured as the
p90-p10 differential. Firms become better at protecting their own product market
through defensive internal innovation but lose their power of creative destruction.
The economy becomes a place where incumbent firms have a high technological
advantage in their own market on average. This is reflected as an increased techno-
logical barrier (measured as one minus the ratio of the success probability of adding
a product divided by the firm-level external innovation intensity). Thus, the startup
rate also declines as external innovation becomes harder. These results are consis-
tent with industry-level regression results using the imposition of PNTR as a foreign
competitive pressure shock, as shown in Table B.22 in the Appendix.
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2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigate how competitive pressure from foreign firms af-
fects firm innovation, high-growth firm activity and firm entry by testing predictions
of the model developed in Chapter 1, and developing a two-country endogenous
growth model with two types of innovation and imperfect technology spillovers,
which is an extension of the baseline model developed in Chapter 1. An increase
in competitive pressure from foreign firms lowers firms’ incentive to invest in ex-
ternal innovation while it encourages investment in internal innovation for products
with a high technological advantage. Therefore, innovation-intensive (and thus high-
growth) firms don’t grow as quickly, and the domestic startup rate falls, after an
increase in competitive pressure from foreign firms.
To test the three model predictions developed in Chapter 1 empirically, I first
construct a comprehensive dataset for a population of patenting firms from 1976 to
2016 using firm-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau integrated with firm-level
patent data from the USPTO. Then I run reduced-form regressions, where I use
the patent data to measure the level and composition of firm innovation. I find
regression results consistent with the model predictions.
Quantitative analysis using my theoretical framework confirms the proposed
mechanism. A 4.16 percentage point reduction in bilateral tariff rates in my model
causes firms to shift their innovation activities toward more internal innovation due
to higher competitive pressure from foreign firms. Consequently, high-growth firms
grow more slowly, as they become less willing to experiment and add new products.
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Also, the startup rate falls, as the heightened technological advantage accumulated
by incumbent firms through internal innovation makes it harder to enter the economy
through external innovation.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop a two-country
endogenous growth model with an escape-competition effect, in which firms are
allowed to grow both through product scope expansion à la Klette and Kortum
(2004) and own product quality improvement as in Aghion et al. (2001), and in
which there is firm entry and exit. Also, this is the first attempt to identify increasing
competitive pressure from foreign firms as a reason for declining business dynamism
in the U.S. economy, and I provide supporting empirical evidence.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1 Appendix
A.1 Baseline Model
A.1.1 Optimal Production and Employment

















where D is the index set for differentiated products produced by domestic firms,
and final good price is normalized to one P “ 1. Thus profits are


















pj yj dj .
FONCs of final good producer’s profit maximization problem w.r.t. kj and L are
B
Byj
























Intermediate good producers, both domestic firms and foreign exporters, take dif-










The FOC of this problem gives us:
B
Byj
: p1´ θqLθ qθj y
´θ
j “ 1 ñ yj “ p1´ θq
1




By plugging in the two optimal choices, differentiated product producer’s profits
from a product line j become






By plugging in optimal differentiated product production rule to (A.2), we get the


























ñ w “ θp1´ θq1´2θq (A.3)
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Finally, using the labor market clearing condition
L “ 1 , (A.4)
we get the equilibrium conditions:
Y “ p1´ θq
1´2θ
θ q (A.5)







π “ θp1´ θq
1´θ
θ . (A.8)
A.1.2 Product Quality Determination
In this section, I will consider all possible cases where firm keeps or loses
its product lines next period and compute the probabilities as functions of internal
innovation intensities and creative destruction arrival rate. Clearly, past period tech-
nology gap ∆t “
qt
qt´1
is the only information needed to compute these probabilities,
as incumbent firm and outside firm trying to take over incumbent firm’s product line
compete with the level of next period product qualities they come up with, where
product quality in period t`1 the incumbent firm will have after internal innovation
improves or fail to improve the product quality by ∆j,t`1 is q
in
j,t`1 “ ∆j,t`1∆j,tqj,t´1,
and product quality the outside firm will have after successful external innovation
is qenj,t`1 “ ηqj,t´1 . I will first show ∆t can assume only four values, ∆
1 “ 1, ∆2 “ λ,
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∆3 “ η, and ∆4 “ η
λ
.
A.1.2.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. To make argument clearer, let’s consider the cases where 1) there is no own-
ership change between t´ 1 and t, and 2) there is ownership change between t´ 1
and t.
1) No ownership change between t ´ 1 and t: In this case, qj,t “ ∆j,tqj,t´1
should hold, where only ∆j,t P t∆
1 “ 1,∆2 “ λu are possible due to the fact that
∆j,t is an outcome of internal innovation.
2) Ownership change between t ´ 1 and t: In this case, qj,t “ ηqj,t´2 should
hold. Let’s consider all potentially possible cases where i. ∆j,t “ 1, ii. ∆j,t “ λ,
iii. ∆j,t “ η, iv. ∆j,t “
η
λ
, v. ∆j,t “
ηn
λm
with n ě m ą 0, and vi. ∆j,t “
λn
ηm
with n ą m ą 0. These are the only potentially possible values ∆ can assume, as
there are only three step sizes (1, λ, and η) product quality can change between two
periods and there cannot be a technology regression (qt ă qt´1). In the end, we will
see that only the first four cases are possible.
case 2)-i. ∆j,t “ 1
For this to be true, qj,t “ qj,t´1 should hold. Since qj,t “ ηqj,t´2,
this implies qj,t´1 “ ηqj,t´2. This is possible if there was external
innovation between t ´ 2 and t ´ 1, and no internal innovation
between t ´ 3 and t ´ 1, thus qj,t´2 “ qj,t´3. Thus ∆j,t “ 1 is
possible with ownership change between t´ 1 and t.
129
case 2)-ii. ∆j,t “ λ
For this to be true, ∆j,t´1 “
η
λ






. This can be possible if there is internal innovation
between t ´ 3 and t ´ 2, and external innovation between t ´ 2
and t ´ 1, but no internal innovation between t ´ 2 and t ´ 1.









. So I proved both ∆j,t “ λ and ∆j,t “
η
λ
are possible and ∆j,t “
η
λ
can be realized only through external
innovation between t´ 1 and t.
case 2)-iii. ∆j,t “ η
For this to be true, qj,t´1 “ qj,t´2 should hold. This is possible if
there is no ownership change and no internal innovation between
t´ 1 and t´ 2. Thus ∆j,t “ η is possible.
case 2)-iv. ∆j,t “
η
λ
The possibility of this case is shown in case 2)-ii.
case 2)-v. ∆j,t “
ηn
λm
with n ě m ą 0
Let’s suppose this is the case. Since ∆j,t R t∆
1 “ 1,∆2 “ λu there
should be an ownership change between t ´ 1 and t. Thus qj,t “
ηqj,t´2 should hold, and this implies qj,t´1 “
λm
ηn´1
qj,t´2. m ď n´ 1
is not possible as this implies technology regression. Let’s suppose
m ą n ´ 1. Since n ě m ą 0, this implies m “ n should hold.
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Suppose this is the case, thus gj,t´2 “
λm
ηm´1
qj.t´1. If the values for
λ, η, and m are such that λ
m
ηm´1
ă 1, then this means technology
regression, which is not possible. Let’s suppose λ
m
ηm´1
ą 1 is true. If
m “ 1, we are back in the case 2)-ii and case 2)-iv. Let’s suppose
m ą 1. Since λ
m
ηm´1
‰ 1 or λ, there should be an ownership change























qj,t´s´1 , s: even number
λm
ηm´1
qj,t´s´1 , s: odd number .
Thus in this case, either qj,1 “
ηm
λm




which is not possible (or I assume this case out). Thus ∆j,t “
ηn
λm
with n ě m ą 0 is not possible.
case 2)-vi. ∆j,t “
λn
ηm
with n ą m ą 0
With a similar argument, this case is not possible.
Therefore ∆j,t can assume only four values,
 




A.1.2.2 Product Quality Evolution for Outsider Firms








Then product quality in period t` 1 evolves probabilistically as:
















λqj,t´1 , with prob. p1´ xq z
1
j
qj,t´1 , with prob. of p1´ xq p1´ z
1
j q
ηqj,t´1 , with prob. x ,
where qj,t´1 “ qj,t,
















λ2qj,t´1 , with prob. z
2
j
λqj,t´1 , with prob. p1´ xq p1´ z
2
j q























λη qj,t´1 , with prob. z
3
j





x p1´ z3j q
η qj,t´1 , with prob.
1
2





































qj,t´1 , with prob. p1´ xq p1´ z
4
j q











A.1.2.3 Product Quality Evolution for an Incumbent Firm
For each ∆`, transition dynamics for product quality and technology gap for





∆1ji “ 0 (or equivalently tq
1
ji
u “ φ) implies firm loses product line ji in the next
period. Here, I write down the expressions as if incumbent firm is doing coin-tossing
at all times.





































































































































































































































































































































































A.1.3 Value Function and Optimal Innovation Decisions
Conditional expectation inside of the expression for the value function is over
the success/failure of internal and external innovation, creative destruction shock
arrival, winning/losing from coin-tosses (c-t), the current period product qual-















































































































depicts subsets of possible realizations for Φf 1 from internal innovation, creative
















Ix q´juzt0u. If ∆
1
ji
“ 0, then firm f loses product
line ji and tpq
1
ji
,∆1jiquzt0u “ t0uzt0u “ ∅.
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A.1.3.1 Proof of Proposition 1




jPJ f |∆j“∆` qj portion of con-











tzjujPJ f , x
ı





































where the first term is expected value from existing product lines and the second
term is expected value from a new product line added through external innovation.
Since realization of internal innovation success/failure and creative destruc-
tion shock are independent from realization of external innovation success/failure,


















































































The second equality follows from the fact that randomly chosen product line with
a quality qj can have technology gap ∆
` with the probability µp∆`q and probability
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of taking over this product line depends on its technology gap. The third equality
follows by integrating product quality over all product line indices.1
First expectation can further divided into four cases, depending on current
































To make formulas easy to write, let’s re-order the product quality portfolio qj ac-
cording to technology gap ∆` and renumber them according to:
qf “
!














































































































1Only the share of technology gap tµp∆`qu4`“1 and average quality q are contained in individual
firm’s information set in terms of firm distribution. That is, for an individual firm, technology gap
and product quality are independent.
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for i “ n1f ` n
2
f ` 1, . . . , nf ´ n
4



































and for i “ nf ´ n
4



















































EBq1 “ Bp1` gqq ,
where g is a growth rate of product qualities in balanced growth path (BGP). Thus

























































































































































































































































































rβp1´ xq rλA2 ´ A1s qji “ 0
ñ z1 “
«









rβ rλA2 ´ p1´ xqA1s qji “ 0
ñ z2 “
«



























































































































By plugging in optimal innovation intensities and equating the LHS to the RHS, we
get the five coefficients of the conjectured value function of the form








q ` λA2p1´ xqz
1

























p1´ z3q ` λA2z
3

























































































A.1.3.2 Proof of Corollary 1






. Then z` ą z`
1
ô rz` ą Ăz`1 for `, `1 P r1, 4s X Z with
pψ ą 1. Since rz2 ´ rz3 “ 1
2
xA1 ą 0, rz2 ´ rz1 “ xλA2 ą 0, rz2 ´ rz4 “
1
2
xλA2 ą 0, and
rz4 ´ rz1 “ 1
2
xλA2 ą 0, we have z
2 ą z3, z2 ą z1, z2 ą z4, and z4 ą z1. Now, if
we know the sign for rz3´ rz4 “ 1
2
x rλA2 ´ A1s then we know the entire relationships
among tz`u4`“1. But in an equilibrium,
rz1 “ p1 ´ xq rλA2 ´ A1s ą 0 should hold,
which implies λA2´A1 ą 0. Thus rz3 ą rz4 ô z
3 ą z4. Therefore, z2 ą z3 ą z4 ą z1.

A.1.3.3 Proof of Corollary 2













































































the sign for 1
2
λA2 ´ A1 is ambiguous. 
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A.1.4 Potential Startups
By plugging in the value function defined in the previous section, the expected
term becomes











































































` µp∆1q ` p1´ z2qµp∆2q
ff
Bp1` gqq .















































A.1.5.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In this model economy, output growth rate is equal to product quality growth
rate. Pick any qj. Then it’s technology gap is equal to ∆j “ ∆
` with the probability
µp∆`q and the probability of ∆1j becoming a certain technology gap depends on this.
If ∆j “ ∆
1, q1j “ ∆
1qj w/ prob. p1´ xqp1´ z
1q
q1j “ ∆
2qj w/ prob. p1´ xqz
1
q1j “ ∆
3qj w/ prob. x
q1j “ ∆
4qj w/ prob. 0
If ∆j “ ∆
2, q1j “ ∆
1qj w/ prob. p1´ xqp1´ z
2q
q1j “ ∆
2qj w/ prob. z
2
q1j “ ∆
3qj w/ prob. 0
q1j “ ∆
4qj w/ prob. xp1´ z
2q
If ∆j “ ∆
3, q1j “ ∆
1qj w/ prob. 1´ z
3
q1j “ ∆
2qj w/ prob. z
3
q1j “ ∆
3qj w/ prob. 0
q1j “ ∆
4qj w/ prob. 0
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If ∆j “ ∆
4, q1j “ ∆
1qj w/ prob. p1´ xqp1´ z
4q
q1j “ ∆
2qj w/ prob. z
4 ` xp1´ z4q
q1j “ ∆
3qj w/ prob. 0
q1j “ ∆



























































The decomposition follows from the straightforward application of the definition of
x and product quality evolution. 
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A.1.6 Technology Gap Portfolio Composition Distribution Transi-
tion
Let’s define technology gap portfolio composition with nf ´ k number of ∆ “
∆1, k number of ∆ “ ∆2, zero number of ∆ “ ∆3 and zero number of ∆ “ ∆4 as
rN pnf , kq ” pnf , nf´k, k, 0, 0q, for k P r0, nf sXZ, nf ą 0. Then without considering






























































































is a combination of selecting k elements from n elements without repetition, where
the order of selection does not matter. Range for rk1 is of the form described as
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above due to the fact that
i. For 0 ď rk ď mintnf ´ k, ku case, the two combinations are well defined for
any rk1 P r0,rks X Z and describes all the possible cases.
ii. For nf ´ k ě k case, k̃ ą k, 0 ď rk ´ rk
1, and 0 ď rk1 ď nf ´ k should be
satisfied. Thus rk ´ k ď rk1 ď rk.
iii. For k ě nf ´ k case, rk ą nf ´ k, 0 ď rk ´ rk
1, and 0 ď rk1 ď nf ´ k should be
satisfied. Thus maxt0, rk ´ ku ď rk1 ď nf ´ k.
By using rPpnf ,rk |nf , kq, probability of N “ rN pnf , kq becoming N 1 “ rN pnf ´h, rkq
for any h ě 0 without considering external innovation can be defined as follows. Take
out h1 number of product lines with ∆ “ ∆1, and h ´ h1 number of product lines
with ∆ “ ∆2 from rN pnf , kq, then compute the probability of rN pnf´h, k´ph´h1qq
becoming rN pnf ´ h, rkq by using rP
´

























































































































for 0 ď h ă nf ,
nf ě 1,
0 ď rk ď nf ´ h,
and 0 ď k ď nf
xnf p1´ z2qk for h “ nf ě 1,
rk “ 0,
and 0 ď k ď nf
0 otherwise.
Range for h1 is defined as above, due to the fact that for any h1, 0 ď h ´ h1 ď k
and 0 ď h1 ď nf ´ k should be satisfied.
By using rP
´
nf ´ h, rk | nf , k
¯
, other possible technology gap portfolio compo-
sition transition probabilities can be described conveniently.
1-i. Probability ofN “ pnf , nf´k, k, 0, 0q becomingN 1 “ pnf´h, nf´h´rk,rk, 0, 0q
for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h, nf ´ h´ rk,rk, 0, 0
ˇ












nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ









nf ´ h´ 1,rk ´ 1
ˇ










The first term is the probability of N becoming N 1 directly via firm’s existing
technology gap portfolio composition change, while external innovation fails.
The second term is the probability of N becoming rN pnf ´ h ´ 1,rkq, then
successful external innovation adds one product line with ∆1 “ ∆1. Since next
period technology gap of product line j from successful external innovation is









, firm needs to take over product line with
technology gap ∆ “ ∆3 “ 1 ` η to have a product line with technology gap
∆1 next period. The third term is the probability of N becoming rN pnf ´
h ´ 1,rk ´ 1q, then successful external innovation adds one product line with
∆1 “ ∆2 by taking over a product line with technology gap ∆ “ ∆4. For
h “ ´1, the first term becomes zero by the definition of rPp ¨ | ¨ q. Thus this
probability is well defined for any h ě ´1.
1-ii. Probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´ h, nf ´ h ´ 1 ´
rk,rk, 1, 0q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 1, 0
ˇ




nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf , k
¯
µp∆1q x .
Firm’s existing technology gap changes from rN pnf , kq to rN pnf ´ h ´ 1,rkq,
then successful external innovation adds ∆1 “ ∆3 “ 1` η.
1-iii. Probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´ h, nf ´ h ´ 1 ´
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rk,rk, 0, 1q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 0, 1
ˇ





nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf , k
¯
µp∆2q x p1´ z2q .
2-i. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 1, 0q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ rk,rk, 0, 0q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h, nf ´ h´ rk,rk, 0, 0
ˇ






















nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 1,rk ´ 1
ˇ























nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ







nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ


























nf ´ h´ 1,rk ´ 1
ˇ







nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 2
ˇ



















Three probabilities in the brackets are the probabilities when the existing
product line with ∆ “ ∆3 is taken over by other firm, internal innovation fails
but firm keeps it, and internal innovation succeeds and firm keeps it. The
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first bracket is the probability of N becoming N 1 when external innovation
fails, the second bracket is the probability of N becoming N 1 when successful
external innovation adds a product line with technology gap ∆1 “ ∆1, and the
third bracket is the probability of N becoming N 1 when successful external
innovation adds a product line with ∆1 “ ∆2. Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ













x p1´ z3q µp∆3q
1
2




1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ
ˇ 1, 0, 0, 1, 0
¯
“z3 p1´ x xtakeoverq `
1
2








2-ii. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 1, 0q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 1, 0q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h,nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 1, 0
ˇ













nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ







nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ












N becomes rN pnf ´ h ´ 1,rkq through internal innovations, then successful
external innovation adds a product line with ∆1 “ ∆3 by taking over a product
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line with ∆ “ ∆1. Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ





x p1´ z3q µp∆1q x .
2-iii. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 1, 0q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 0, 1q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h,nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 0, 1
ˇ













nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ







nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ











ˆ µp∆2q x p1´ z2q .
Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ





x p1´ z3q µp∆2q x p1´ z2q .
3-i. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 0, 1q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ rk,rk, 0, 0q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h, nf ´ h´ rk,rk, 0, 0
ˇ

























nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf ´ 1, k
¯
p1´ xq p1´ z4q
` rP
´
nf ´ h´ 1,rk ´ 1
ˇ





























nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf ´ 1, k
¯
p1´ xq p1´ z4q
` rP
´
nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ































nf ´ h´ 1,rk ´ 1
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ
ˇ nf ´ 1, k
¯
p1´ xq p1´ z4q
` rP
´
nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 2
ˇ
























Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ
ˇ 1, 0, 0, 0, 1
¯















1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ

























3-ii. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 0, 1q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 1, 0q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h,nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 1, 0
ˇ














nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf ´ 1, k
¯
p1´ xq p1´ z4q
` rP
´
nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ
















ˆ µp∆1q x .
Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ










3-iii. For nf ě 2, probability of N “ pnf , nf ´ 1 ´ k, k, 0, 1q becoming N 1 “ pnf ´
h, nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 0, 1q for h ě ´1 is defined as
P
´
nf ´ h,nf ´ h´ 1´ rk,rk, 0, 1
ˇ













nf ´ h´ 1,rk
ˇ










nf ´ h´ 2,rk
ˇ
ˇ nf ´ 1, k
¯
p1´ xq p1´ z4q
` rP
´
nf ´ h´ 2,rk ´ 1
ˇ
















ˆ µp∆2q x p1´ z2q .
Similarly, for nf “ 1,
P
´
1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ









µp∆2q x p1´ z2q .
Now that the probabilities of any particular technology gap portfolio composition
becoming other particular technology gap portfolio composition is computed, I can
specify the inflows and outflows of a particular technology gap portfolio. Let F be a
total mass of firms in the economy and let µpN q be a share of firms with technology
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gap portfolio N .
i) For N “ pnf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0q with nf ě 2, any firms with technology gap
portfolio next period not equal to N accounts for outflows. Thus
outflow
`






nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
ˇ





nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
˘
.
Any firms with total number of product line n ě nf ´ 1 can have technology
gap portfolio composition equal to N through combinations of internal and
external innovations. Thus for the maximum number of product lines n̄f ,
inflow
`

















nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
ˇ








nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
ˇ








nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
ˇ









nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
ˇ
ˇ nf , nf ´ k, k, 0, 0
˘
.
ii) N “ pnf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0q with nf ě 2
outflow
`







nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
ˇ



























nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
ˇ








nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
ˇ








nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
ˇ









nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
ˇ
ˇ nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 1, 0
˘
.
iii) N “ pnf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1q with nf ě 2
outflow
`






nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
ˇ



























nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
ˇ









nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
ˇ








nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
ˇ









nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
ˇ
ˇ nf , nf ´ 1´ k, k, 0, 1
˘
.
iv) N “ p1, 1, 0, 0, 0q
outflow
`






1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ





1, 1, 0, 0, 0
˘
.


















1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ








1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ








1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ









1, 1, 0, 0, 0
ˇ




v) N “ p1, 0, 1, 0, 0q
outflow
`






1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ





1, 0, 1, 0, 0
˘
.





















1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ








1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ








1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ









1, 0, 1, 0, 0
ˇ
ˇ 1, 0, 1, 0, 0
˘
.
vi) N “ p1, 0, 0, 1, 0q
outflow
`






1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ





1, 0, 0, 1, 0
˘
.















1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ









1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ








1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ









1, 0, 0, 1, 0
ˇ
ˇ 1, 0, 0, 1, 0
˘
.
vii) N “ p1, 0, 0, 0, 1q
outflow
`






1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ





1, 0, 0, 0, 1
˘
.















1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ








1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ








1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ









1, 0, 0, 0, 1
ˇ




A.1.6.1 Number of points in technology gap portfolio composition
distribution
Let’s denote Npnf q as the number of variations for a technology gap portfolio





















t0, 1u, and n3f “ n
4
f “ 1 is not possible.
Let’s denote rNpnf q as the number of variations for a technology gap port-







f , 0, 0
˘
. Then















f , 0, 0
˘















f , 0, 0
˘
` p1, 0, 0, 0, 1q .
Since rNpnf q “ nf ` 1, Npnf q “ 3 nf ` 1. Thus for a maximum number of product

















A.1.7 Total Mass of Product Lines Owned by the Domestic Firms
A.1.7.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Since the optimal probability of external innovation for both domestic firms
and foreign exporters are the same, the aggregate creative destruction arrival rate
can be decomposed into:







In any stationary equilibrium, the share of domestic incumbent firms should be







Since all the incumbent firms are homogeneous in terms of their optimal R&D
decisions, and external innovation is undirected, the share of domestic incumbent
firms should be equal to sd in an equilibrium. Then by rearranging x and multiplying
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it by sd, we get
sdx “ sd
`
































A.2 Simple Three-Period Model
A.2.1 Proof for Proposition 3
Proof. The first part of proposition 3 follows from simple algebra. I prove the second
























pλ´ 1qp1´ xj,1q ă 0 .





























































































From x˚j,1, we see that
ηπj,2
2rχ































A.2.2 Proof of Corollary 3


































where the signs of the two derivatives follow from proposition 3. Then, the results
follow from proposition 3 
A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 4


































where the signs for the two derivatives follow from proposition 4 
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A.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5

























pλ´ 1qp1´ 2xj,1qp1´ xoq ,



























































































































Appendix B: Chapter 2 Appendix
B.1 Data Appendix
B.1.1 Summary Statistics
Table B.1: Trade-shock related measures
NTR gap Dnstream NTR g. Upstream NTR g. NTR rate Non-NTR r. Export shock
Mean 0.291 0.138 0.203 0.027 0.303 1.127
(Std. dev.) (0.127) (0.060) (0.073) (0.022) (0.134) (0.970)
cov( , NTR gap) 0.485 0.434 0.412 0.969 0.214
cov( , Up. NTR g.) 0.204
Table B.2: Firm-level NTR gap constructed using different weights
NTR gap, unweighted NTR gap, main industry
Mean 0.333 0.336
(Std. dev.) (0.107) (0.116)
cov( , NTR gap) 0.78 0.86
cov( , NTR gap, main industry) 0.906
Table B.3: Technology shocks
Past 5 years 5 years onward
own US shock own foreign shock outside f. shock own f. shock outside f. shock
Mean 0.388 0.342 0.188 0.344 0.257
(Std. dev.) (0.306) (0.299) (0.064) (0.304) (0.161)
cov( , past own f.) 0.593 -0.059
cov( , past out f.) -0.191 0.151 -0.991
cov( , onward out f.) 0.541
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Table B.4: All patenting firms vs. regression sample patenting firms in 1992
All patenting firms Regression sample
Average number of patents 6.15 8.86
(19.46) (24.10)
Average self-citation rate 0.0434 0.0540
(0.0899) (0.0941)
Innovation intensity 0.055 0.093
(0.25) (0.33)




Patent stock 6.45 35.22
(26.61) (64.37)
Employment growth 0.07 0.06
(0.60) (0.40)
Firm age 12.33 15.65
(6.76) (9.42)
7yr patent growth -0.854
(1.312)
7yr self-citation ratio growth 0.356
(1.322)
Number of firms 26,500 3,100
Table B.5: Export Share of Total Value of Shipments (CMF exporters)
1992 2002 2007
Avg. of firm-level exp/vship 4.99% 5.27% 6.41%
Avg. of firm-level CN exp/vship 0.70% 0.89% 1.17%
Aggregate-level exp/vship 7.76% 9.29% 10.46%
Aggregate-level CN exp/vship 0.19% 0.38% 0.64%
Table B.6: Share of Exporters (LBD firms)
Year 1992 2002 2007
Share of exporters 15.90% 22.10% 24.00%
Share of firms exporting to CN 0.60% 2.30% 4.00%
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B.1.2 Overall and Escape-Competition Effect
Table B.7: Overall Effect
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post 0.226 0.049 0.025 0.052
(0.230) (0.279) (0.260) (0.291)
NTR gap -2.222*** 0.569 1.104*** -0.117
(0.372) (0.405) (0.317) (0.393)
Post -0.276*** -0.198** -0.092 -0.021
(0.077) (0.082) (0.080) (0.084)
Past 5yr ∆pat in own tech. 0.170* 0.282***
(0.087) (0.091)
Log employment 0.134*** 0.014
(0.013) (0.014)
Firm age -0.005** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002)
NTR rate -2.273 1.222
(1.690) (2.267)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Controls no full no full
Notes: Full controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technol-
ogy fields, log employment, firm age, NTR rate, dummy for publicly traded firms,
dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy for firms with total exports ą 0,
and dummy for firms with imports from relative parties ą 0. Estimates for industry
(j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major industries are
displayed below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts
are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, **
p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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Table B.8: Escape-competition effect
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post 0.238 0.054 -0.075 -0.051
(0.237) (0.287) (0.257) (0.295)
ˆ Innovation-intensity 0.077 -0.017 0.732** 0.784***
(0.231) (0.233) (0.299) (0.268)
NTR gap -2.206*** 0.593 1.101*** -0.067
(0.375) (0.409) (0.315) (0.397)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.226 -0.213 -0.198 -0.379
(0.158) (0.175) (0.231) (0.231)
Post -0.277*** -0.202** -0.071 -0.002
(0.078) (0.083) (0.080) (0.083)
ˆ Innovation-intensity -0.053 0.017 -0.179* -0.198**
(0.070) (0.075) (0.095) (0.085)
Innovation-intensity 0.080* 0.057 0.059 0.086
(0.048) (0.046) (0.070) (0.066)
NTR rate -2.403 1.021
(1.703) (2.272)
ˆ Innovation-intensity 0.593 0.539
(0.507) (0.484)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Controls no full no full
Notes: Full controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own
technology fields, log employment, firm age, NTR rate, dummy for publicly
traded firms, dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy for firms with
total exports ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from relative parties ą
0. Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the
constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed below each coefficient.
Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census
Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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B.1.3 Import Competition
Table B.9: Effect of PNTR on US imports from China
∆log(CN imp) ∆log(CN imp)
HS8-level NAICS6-level
(1) (2)
NTR gap 0.631*** 0.846*
(0.216) (0.509)
∆log(NTR rate) -6.497** -7.696*
(3.210) (4.206)
∆log(Transport cost) -2.638** -2.509
(1.119) (1.613)
Obsevations 6862 490
Notes: Table reports results of OLS regressions of
changes in US imports from China from 2000 to 2007
on NTR gap at the 8-digit HS level, and 6-digit
NAICS level. NTR rates at the 8-digit HS level are
from the United States International Trade Commission
(https://dataweb.usitc.gov/tariff/annual). Data for 8-digit
HS level US imports from China and transport cost is from
Schott (2008) (https://sompks4.github.io/sub data.html).
NTR rates and transport costs are in their iceberg form (e.g.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.1.4 Firm Growth and Two Types of Innovation
Akcigit and Kerr (2018) show that internal innovation contributes less to firm
employment growth by using the LBD. Here, I replicate their result while including
firm controls for the Census years: 1982, and 1992 and construct non-overlapping
five-year first differences (DHS growth) by using the LBD matched USPTO patent
database. I estimate the following fixed-effect regression model:
∆Yijt`5 “ β1Patijt ` β2Internalijt `Xijt γ1 ` δjt`5 ` εijt`5
For firm i in industry j, ∆Yijt`5 is a 5-year DHS growth rate of i) firm employment
growth from year t to t ` 5, and ii) number of six-digit NAICS industries added.
Patijt is a log of citation adjusted number of patents in year t, and Internalijt is
an citation-adjusted average self-citation ratio in year t. Firm and industry controls
include firm age, and log of payroll. The regression is unweighted and standard
errors are clustered on firm. Based on Akcigit and Kerr (2018) we expect β1 to
be positive while β2 to be negative, as internal innovation contributes less to firm
employment growth. I run the same regression model with the number of products
(seven-digit NAICS product codes) added by using the CMF firms.
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Table B.11: Real effect of innovation: employment growth, industry add, and prod-
uct add
LBD firms CMF firms
∆Employment Log nb. of industries added Log nb. of products added
(1) (2) (3)
Log nb. of patents 0.031*** 0.098*** 0.078***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Avg. self-citation -0.269** -0.154** -0.343***
(0.106) (0.078) (0.102)
Log payroll -0.025*** 0.083*** 0.154***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
Firm age -0.004** -0.004** -0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Innovation intensity 0.032 0.009 0.076’***
(0.029) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 5,400 5,400 5,700
Fixed effects jp jp jp
Notes: Estimates for industry-period (jp) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm-level are displayed below each coefficient.
Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure
avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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B.1.5 Pre-trend and Robustness
Table B.12: Parallel pre-trend test
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap -0.393 -0.379 -0.559 -0.551
(0.487) (0.488) (0.403) (0.403)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.193 -0.0057
(0.162) (0.394)
NTR gap ˆ It1992u 0.520 0.498 0.254 0.261
(0.355) (0.361) (0.294) (0.290)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.092 -0.114
(0.243) (0.490)
Observations 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Notes: Full controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own
technology fields, log employment, firm age, and dummy for publicly traded
firms. Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as
the constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed below each coefficient.
Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census
Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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Table B.13: Foreign competition shock with I-O
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.111 -0.111 -0.290 -0.415
(0.332) (0.343) (0.355) (0.354)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.054 0.825***
(0.319) (0.282)
NTR gap 0.580 0.613 -0.096 -0.038
(0.406) (0.411) (0.382) (0.387)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.275 -0.407
(0.203) (0.262)
Post -0.254** -0.264** -0.145 -0.137
(0.110) (0.111) (0.122) (0.123)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.158 -0.098
(0.142) (0.139)
Innovation intensity 0.057 0.089
(0.047) (0.068)
NTR rate -2.314 -2.512 1.129 0.900
(1.670) (1.704) (2.237) (2.240)
ˆ Innovation intensity 1.027 0.666
(0.874) (0.765)
Downstream X Post 0.501 0.492 0.965 0.979
(0.597) (0.602) (0.707) (0.715)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.241 -0.019
(0.525) (0.348)
Upstream X Post 0.161 0.196 0.430 0.491
(0.443) (0.447) (0.480) (0.482)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.497 -0.382
(0.381) (0.418)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Notes: Controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log employ-
ment, firm age, NTR rate, dummy for publicly traded firms, dummy for firms with total imports
ą 0, dummy for firms with total exports ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from relative
parties ą 0. Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant
are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major
industries are displayed below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts
are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, ***
p ă 0.01.
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Table B.14: Overall response: different weights for firm-level tariff measures
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.139 -0.017 0.133 0.091
(0.331) (0.247) (0.311) (0.260)
NTR gap 0.943** omitted -0.240 omited
(0.374) (0.349)
Post -0.146 -0.194*** -0.024 -0.036
(0.107) (0.074) (0.106) (0.076)
NTR rate -1.763 -2.360 1.614 0.368
(1.533) (1.871) (1.792) (2.373)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Weights for tariffs unweighted major indust. unweighted major indust.
Notes: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences regressions in which firm-
level tariff measures are constructed with different weights. Controls include past 5-year U.S.
patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log employment, firm age, NTR rate, dummy for
publicly traded firms, dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy for firms with total exports
ą 0, and dummy for firms with imports from relative parties ą 0 (full controls). Estimates for
industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust standard
errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed below each
coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census Bureau
disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
178
Table B.15: Escape-competition effect: different weights for firm-level tariff mea-
sures
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.131 -0.015 0.017 0.021
(0.339) (0.251) (0.310) (0.260)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.038 0.017 0.754*** 0.745***
(0.218) (0.218) (0.261) (0.263)
NTR gap 0.962** omitted -0.189 omitted
(0.376) (0.350)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.268 -0.235 -0.380* -0.395*
(0.168) (0.173) (0.228) (0.229)
Post -0.150 -0.197*** 0.004 -0.024
(0.109) (0.074) (0.105) (0.075)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.002 0.008 -0.191** -0.185**
(0.071) (0.071) (0.082) (0.083)
Innovation intensity 0.065 0.056 0.085 0.085
(0.045) (0.046) (0.066) (0.066)
NTR rate -1.839 -2.482 1.468 0.256
(1.541) (1.874) (1.795) (2.372)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.583 0.584 0.576 0.666
(0.517) (0.525) (0.489) (0.477)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Weights for tariffs unweighted major indust. unweighted major indust.
Notes: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences regressions in which firm-
level tariff measures are constructed with different weights. Full controls are included. Estimates
for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed
below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to
Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
Table B.16: Use inverse of the propensity scores to re-weight observations
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.085 -0.058 -0.065 -0.294
(0.417) (0.420) (0.362) (0.351)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.033 0.794***
(0.271) (0.269)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Regression weights inv. propens. inv. propens. inv. propens. inv. propens.
Notes: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences regressions in which ob-
servations are weighted by the inverse of the propensity scores from logit model (y = indicator for
analysis sample). Full controls are included. Estimates for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed
effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at
the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed below each coefficient. Observation counts
are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, ***
p ă 0.01.
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Table B.17: Add the cumulative number of patents as a firm-level control variable
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.000 0.004 0.088 -0.015
(0.279) (0.287) (0.290) (0.289)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.011 0.786***
(0.231) (0.268)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
Notes: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences regressions in which firm-
level cumulative number of patents are included as a control. Full controls are included. Estimates
for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level of the firms’ major industries are displayed
below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to
Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
Table B.18: Cluster standard errors on firms
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NTR gap ˆ Post 0.004 0.010 0.103 -0.000
(0.287) (0.290) (0.308) (0.311)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.012 0.784***
(0.235) (0.274)
Observations 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500
Fixed effects j, p j, p j, p j, p
se. cluster firmid firmid firmid firmid
Notes: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences regressions in which robust
standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. Full controls are included. Estimates
for industry (j) and the period (p) fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Observa-
tions are unweighted. Observation counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance
procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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Table B.19: Effect of foreign competition on product add
Log number of products added Log number of products added
(1) (2)
NTR gap ˆ Post -0.209*** -0.208***
(0.067) (0.068)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.554***
(0.196)





Fixed effects j, p j, p
Notes: Controls include past 5-year U.S. patent growth in firms’ own technology fields, log payroll,
firm age, NTR rate and its interaction with innovation intensity, dummy for publicly traded firms,
dummy for firms with total imports ą 0, dummy for firms with total exports ą 0, and dummy
for firms with imports from relative parties ą 0. Estimates for industry-period (jp) fixed effects
as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the level
of the firms’ major industries are displayed below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted.
Observation counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1,
** p ă 0.05, *** p ă 0.01.
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B.1.6 Technological Barrier Effect
Table B.20: Technological-barrier effect
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Past 5yr ∆foreign patent, -5.984** -5.209* 9.076*** 8.712***
outside of own technology field (2.756) (2.733) (2.711) (2.740)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.161 -0.365
(0.240) (0.264)
Past 5yr ∆foreign patent, 0.005 -0.006 0.033 0.021
inside of own technology field (0.079) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
ˆ Innovation intensity 0.048 0.047
(0.055) (0.059)
Observation 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600
Fixed effects jp jp jp jp
Notes: Full controls except for the NTR rate are included. Estimates for industry-period (jp)
fixed effects as well as the constant are suppressed. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
at the firm-level are displayed below each coefficient. Observations are unweighted. Observation
counts are rounded due to Census Bureau disclosure avoidance procedures. * p ă 0.1, ** p ă 0.05,
*** p ă 0.01.
Table B.21: Effect of concurrent technological shocks
∆Patents ∆Patents ∆Self-cite ∆Self-cite
(1) (2) (3) (4)
5yr ∆foreign patent, -8.680** -7.637** 14.15*** 13.56***
outside of own technology field (3.546) (3.521) (3.540) (3.565)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.063 0.081
(0.114) (0.122)
5yr ∆foreign patent, 0.212*** 0.228*** 0.133* 0.118
inside of own technology field (0.075) (0.077) (0.075) (0.076)
ˆ Innovation intensity -0.069 0.067
(0.062) (0.074)
Observation 7,600 7,600 7,600 7,600
Fixed effects jp jp jp jp
Notes: Description the same as Table B.20.
B.1.7 Industry-Level Regression
To estimate the effect of Chinese competition shock on the industry-level busi-
ness dynamism statistics, I run the following regression model for the years from
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1992 to 2007
Yjt “ β1PostPNTR ˆNTRGapj ` Xjt γ1 ` Xj0 γ2 ` δj ` δt ` α ` εjt ,
(B.1)
where Yjt is i) log of employment, ii) young firm share iii) startup rates, iv) exit
rates, v) 90th percentile of firm employment growth rates, and vi) 10th percentile
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for the case when business takeover is successful.
B.2.1.2 Aggregate Quality Evolution
B.2.1.2.1 Proof for Q and q Evolution
Proof. Here, I prove Proposition 8 for a general case. Application of proper index
functions provides equation (2.19). Pick any product line j with product quality qHj




, ∆G P rΩ,Ωs Y t8u. Then with P p∆1|∆q:
probability of ∆ becoming ∆1, which is described in Appendix B.3.1, the conditional



























where the second equality follows from ∆ K qHj , thus, ∆























∆H1 P p∆1|∆q µp∆q
ff
qHj . (B.2)
Summation of (B.2) over a proper subset provides law of motion for Q
rcH and qH .




“ qH in equilibrium, by summing up (B.2) over possible
















∆H1 P p∆1|∆q µp∆q ´ 1 .
The law of motion for country F can be defined symmetrically. 
B.3 Technical Appendix
B.3.1 Technology-Gaps Evolution
Denote xH as total external innovation intensity by domestic firms (both in-
cumbents and startups), xF as that of foreign counterparts, and x ” xH ` xF as a
total external innovation intensity in the economy.
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B.3.1.1 (H H) case
For any qj, the followings hold, where the last column specifies ownership
change in domestic and foreign market.












































































































a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zHqp1´ xq x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH p1´ xq x x
b. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q w/ p1´ zHq xH o o
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q w/ zH xH o o
c-i. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1{η no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ p1´ zHq xF x o
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
c-ii. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ λ{η H int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ zH xF x o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
(B.3)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zHqp1´ xq x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH p1´ xq x x
b. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆4 ∆4q w/ p1´ zHq xH o o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH xH x x
c-i. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ λ{η no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ p1´ zHq xF x o
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
c-ii. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ λ2{η H int. innov.
pF F q, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ zH xF x o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
(B.4)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zHqp1´ xq x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH p1´ xq x x
b. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zHq xH 12
1
2
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH xH x x
c-i. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1 no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ p1´ zHq xF x o
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
c-ii. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ λ H int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ zH xF x o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
(B.5)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zHqp1´ xq x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH p1´ xq x x
b. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 8
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ p1´ zHq xH o o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zH xH 12
1
2
c-i. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1{λ no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ p1´ zHq xF x o
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
c-ii. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1 H int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω o o




w/ zH xF x o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x x
(B.6)
B.3.1.2 (F F) case
For any qj, the followings hold.
191












































































































a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF p1´ xq x x
b-i. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ η no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ p1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b-ii. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ η{λ F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
c. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q w/ p1´ zF q xF o o
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q w/ zF xF o o
(B.7)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF p1´ xq x x
b-i. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ η{λ no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ p1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b-ii. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ η{λ2 F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
c. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆4 ∆4q w/ p1´ zF q xF o o
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF xF x x
(B.8)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF p1´ xq x x
b-i. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1 no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ p1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b-ii. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1{λ F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
c. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zF q xF 12
1
2
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF xF x x
(B.9)
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a. no ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q w/ p1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ zF p1´ xq x x
b-i. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ λ no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆1 ∆1q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ p1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b-ii. H ext. innov. ∆G1 “ 1 F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω x x




w/ zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
c. F ext. innov. ∆G1 “ ´8
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q w/ p1´ zF q xF o o




B.3.1.3 (H F) case
For any qj, ∆





. Thus, if ∆G1 ă ∆G, then pHHq cannot be realized next period,
and if ∆G1 ą ∆G, then pF F q cannot be realized.
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B.3.1.3.1 No External Innovation










































































a. ∆G1 “ ∆G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
b. ∆G1 “ λ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF qp1´ xq x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x o
c. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF p1´ xq o x





d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF p1´ xq x x
(B.11)
B.3.1.3.2 External Innovation by a Domestic Firm
Since domestic firm builds its external innovation on the past-period domestic tech-
nology, technology gap in foreign market does not matter in terms of realized out-
comes in this case.



























































































a. ∆G1 “ η∆G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b. ∆G1 “ η∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
c. ∆G1 “ ηλ∆
G F int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHq zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
d. ∆G1 “ ηλ∆
G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xH o x
pH Hq, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
(B.12)



















































































a. ∆G1 “ ηλ∆
G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b. ∆G1 “ λ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xH x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x o
c. ∆G1 “ η
λ2
∆G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xH o x





d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xH x x
(B.13)











































































a. ∆G1 “ ∆G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xH 12 x
b. ∆G1 “ λ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xH x x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x o
c. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xH o x






d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xH x x
(B.14)











































































a. ∆G1 “ λ∆G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xH o x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω o o
b. ∆G1 “ λ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xH 12 x
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω 12 o
c. ∆G1 “ ∆G F int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHq zF xH o x
d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xH 12 x
(B.15)
B.3.1.3.3 External Innovation by a Foreign Firm



























































































a. ∆G1 “ 1η∆
G no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xF o o





b. ∆G1 “ λη∆
G H int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ zH p1´ zF q xF o o





c. ∆G1 “ 1η∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xF o o





d. ∆G1 “ λη∆
G all int. innov.
pF F q, p∆3 ∆3q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ zH zF xF o o

























































































a. ∆G1 “ λη∆
G no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆4 ∆4q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xF o o





b. ∆G1 “ λ
2
η ∆
G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xF x o
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x o
c. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xF o x





d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xF x x
(B.17)










































































a. ∆G1 “ ∆G no int. innov.




w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xF x 12
b. ∆G1 “ λ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xF x 12
pH Hq, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ą Ω x o
c. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xF o x





d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xF x x
(B.18)
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a. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G no int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q xF o o





b. ∆G1 “ ∆G H int. innov.




w/ zH p1´ zF q xF x o
c. ∆G1 “ 1λ∆
G F int. innov.
pF F q, p∆2 ∆2q if ∆G1 ă Ω w/ p1´ zHq zF xF o 12





d. ∆G1 “ ∆G all int. innov.




w/ zH zF xF x 12
(B.19)
203








for internal innovation intensity terms are omitted for no-
tational simplicity. They should match to that of µp¨q. Here,
ř
∆G is sum over
∆G P rΩ,Ωs.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































p∆H ∆F q‰p∆1 ∆1q
“



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.3.2 External Innovation Outcomes
B.3.2.1 Outcomes from a Successful External Innovation, Home Firm
`









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q
`
η














































































































































































B.3.2.2 Outcomes from a Successful External Innovation, Foreign
Firm
`
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































w/ p1´ zHqp1´ zF q
`
η



















































































































w/ p1´ zHqp1´ 12z
F q
`



















































































































































p1´ zHq ` λzH
‰



































































































































p1´ zHq ` λzH
‰
xH
`r I2 p1q ` I3 p1q s p1´ zHqxF






























p1´ zHq ` λzH
‰

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r I2 pλq ` I3 pλq s λ p1´ zF qxH
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I1 pλq p1´ zF q ` I1 p1q λ zF
‰
























































































































































































































































p1´ zF q ` λzF
‰
p1´ xq














































































































p1´ zF q ` λzF
‰
p1´ xq












































p1´ zF q ` λzF
‰
p1´ xq
` r I1 pλq ` I2 pλq s p1´ zF qxH









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































r I1 p1q ` I2 p1q s p1´ zHqxF






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































p1´ zHqp1´ xq ` λ zHp1´ xq
`p1´ zHqxH ` λ zH xH









































































































































B.3.3.1 Proof of Proposition 6
B.3.4 Value Function
B.3.4.1 One Product Case Example
For Φf “ tp q H H ∆1 ∆1 8 qu,
V
`
q ∆1 ∆1 8
˘

















































q ∆1 ∆1 8
˘ ( ˘
ˆ p1´ zqp1´ xq
` V
`  `
λq ∆2 ∆2 8
˘ ( ˘
ˆ z p1´ xq
` V p∅q ˆ p1´ zq xH












































































































































































































q ∆1 ∆1 8
˘
, Φ1´j | Φ´j , IZH´j , IZF´j , c´ t´j
( ˘
ˆ p1´ zqp1´ xq
` V
`  `
λq ∆2 ∆2 8
˘
, Φ1´j | Φ´j , IZH´j , IZF´j , c´ t´j
( ˘
ˆ z p1´ xq
` V
`  
Φ1´j | Φ´j , IZH´j , IZF´j , c´ t´j
( ˘
ˆ p1´ zq xH
` V
`  

























q ∆1 ∆3 1η
¯









q ∆1 ∆1 8
˘








































λ q ∆2 ∆3 λη
¯









λq ∆2 ∆2 8
˘

































































ˆ µ pΦ´jq dpΦ´jq x ,
where I1p∆Gq is an indicator equal to one if ∆G ă Ω, I2p∆Gq is an indicator equal




, and I3p∆Gq is an indicator equal to one if ∆G ą Ω. Then,



















































A p∆1 ∆1 8 q q ˆ p1´ zqp1´ xq
` A p∆2 ∆2 8 qλ q ˆ z p1´ xq
` 0 ˆ p1´ zq xH





























































































































































































where 1 ` g “ q
1
q
. Define Atakeover as the terms in the last brackets. Then from
FONCs, we get




























































































































































































































































Value function and internal innovation intensity for other cases can be derived
symmetrically.
































where Atakeover is defined below.
B.3.4.2.1 Optimal Internal Innovation Intensity, Home Firm
H superscripts from all the Ap¨q and zp¨q are dropped for notational simplicity.
























































































































































































































































































Here, zF corresponds to the internal innovation intensity under the same state vari-
able we consider for zH and the state-variable notations are removed for notational
simplicity.
For pH F q cases, the terms corresponding to no external innovation by either


















































zF p1´ xq ,





used. For any ∆H , terms corresponding to foreign external innovation depend only




















































































































































































Similarly for any ∆F , terms corresponding to domestic external innovation depend



















































































































































































B.3.4.2.2 Value from Existing Product, Home Firm





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Both zH and zF are the ones corresponding to the state-variable of interest. The

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.3.4.2.4 Optimal Internal Innovation Intensity, Foreign Firm
F superscripts from all the Ap¨q and zp¨q are dropped for notational simplicity.












































































































































































































































































Here, zF corresponds to the internal innovation intensity under the same state vari-
able we consider for zH and the state-variable notations are removed for notational
simplicity.
For pH F q cases, the terms corresponding to no external innovation by either





















































zH p1´ xq .
For any ∆F , terms corresponding to domestic external innovation depend only on







































































































































































Similarly for any ∆H , terms corresponding to foreign external innovation depend
only on foreign technology gap ∆F and global technology gap ∆G. Thus, for AzHH`












































































































































For any `H P t1 , 2 , 3 , 4u, the following holds:
zF p∆`
H















































B.3.4.2.5 Value from Existing Product, Foreign Firm


































A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q ˆ
`
1´ z p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q
˘
p1´ xq






A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q I1 pηq
































































































A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q ˆ
`
1´ z p∆2 ∆2 ´8 q
˘
p1´ xq






















































λ ˆ z p∆2 ∆2 ´8 q xH






































































A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q ˆ
`
1´ z p∆3 ∆3 ´8 q
˘
p1´ xq






A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q I1 p1q


































λ ˆ z p∆3 ∆3 ´8 q xH
` A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q ˆ 1
2
`
1´ z p∆3 ∆3 ´8 q
˘
xF





































































A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q ˆ
`
1´ z p∆4 ∆4 ´8 q
˘
p1´ xq






A p∆1 ∆1 ´8 q I1 pλq















A p∆2 ∆2 ´8 q I1 p1q





λ ˆ z p∆4 ∆4 ´8 q xH
` A p∆2 ∆2 ´8 qλ ˆ 1
2





























Both zH and zF are the ones corresponding to the state-variable of interest. The























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.3.4.3 Potential Startup’s Problem






































































































































































LH “ LH ´ rLH
LF “ LF ´ rLF
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PH “ PF “ 1 (under Assumption 2)
257
B.3.5.3 Aggregate External Innovation Intensity
For c P tH,F u,
xc “ xc Fc ` xce Ec ,
and
x “ xH ` xF .
B.3.5.4 International Trade
B.3.5.4.1 Value of Trade







































Value of final good traded (in a perspective of home country):






















































Recall: qH “ QHH `QFH , and qF “ QFF `QHF . In a BGP, Qcc and Qc1c should
grow at the same rate as qc or one should completely dominate another. We can see
































B.3.5.5 Other Macroeconomic Variables
CH “ wHLH ` ΠH ` rΠH `GH
CF “ wFLF ` ΠF ` rΠF `GF
259
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